Zero-shot adaptation to order book dynamics

We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully censored feedback, we introduce an action-dependent feedback model inspired by real limit order books: when a trade occurs, the trader's valuation remains hidden, whereas when no trade occurs, informative feedback about supply and demand is revealed. We show that this additional information fundamentally changes the learnability of the problem. In the stochastic setting with i.i.d. market prices, we propose an elimination-based algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt T)$ regret with high probability, without requiring any smoothness assumptions on the distribution of trader valuations. We then extend this result to a broad class of mean-reverting price processes by considering both local, autoregressive dynamics and a weaker global drift condition based on cumulative deviations from the mean. Under either assumption, we establish high-probability $O(\sqrt T)$ regret bounds, relying on a new concentration inequality of independent interest. Finally, in the adversarial setting with oblivious prices, we design an explore-then-perturb algorithm that guarantees $O(T^{2/3})$ regret in expectation. Our results quantify the value of observing the order book in online market making and demonstrate that even limited, action-dependent feedback can substantially improve regret guarantees compared to standard bandit feedback models.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

High-fidelity, scalable market simulation is a key instrument for mechanism evaluation, stress testing, and counterfactual policy analysis. Yet existing simulators rarely achieve \emph{mechanism fidelity} beyond single-asset intraday settings, \emph{microstructure fidelity} against historical limit order books (LOB), and \emph{computational tractability} at market scale in a single system. This paper presents \textit{EvoMarket}, a discrete-event, multi-agent financial market simulator designed for intervention-oriented experiments in multi-asset and cross-day environments. EvoMarket couples a high-throughput execution core (optimized LOB data structures, hierarchical scheduling under propagation delays, and asynchronous per-asset matching) with explicit institutional mechanisms (market calendars, opening call auctions, price limits, and T+1 settlement). To avoid expensive black-box calibration, EvoMarket introduces an Oracle-guided in-run self-calibration mechanism that interprets microstructure discrepancy as missing order flow and synthesizes corrective orders at recording checkpoints. Experiments on China A-share order-flow and LOB data show close replay alignment over five trading days, fidelity gains from budgeted in-run calibration across depth levels, broad agent order-space coverage, and scalable performance under increasing input order rates and market breadth. We further demonstrate cross-asset linkage and event-study style intervention evaluation that produces structured dependence and interpretable event-time responses.