CCLab: Adversarial Testing of Learning- and Non-Learning-Based Congestion Controllers
Authors: Zhi Chen, Shehab Sarar Ahmed, Chenkai Wang, Brighten Godfrey, Gang Wang
Organizations: UIUC · UIUC & BUET
Abstract
Congestion controllers (CCs) are critical to network performance, and yet their robustness under adverse conditions remains insufficiently understood. While recent learning-based CCs have demonstrated strong performance in controlled environments, it is unclear how they compare to traditional CCs when controllers' input signals are corrupted or when environmental conditions become systematically challenging. In this paper, we introduce CCLab, an adversarial testing framework for systematically evaluating the robustness of both learning-based and non-learning-based CCs. CCLab includes a reinforcement learning (RL)-based adversarial agent that operates in a closed loop with the congestion control policy, generating bounded perturbations either on input signals (feature-level) or on external network conditions (environment-level), while preserving realism through explicit constraints. Using this framework, we compare learning-based CCs with non-learning-based CCs under both feature-level and environment-level adversarial conditions. While both types of CCs suffer from performance degradation under adversarial testing, we find that learning-based CCs, in general, are more robust than traditional human-designed algorithms. Finally, we show that our adversarial traces can be used to train more robust CCs that outperform existing learning-based CCs under both challenging and normal conditions.
RL-based controllers achieve strong average-case performance in networking tasks such as congestion control and adaptive bitrate streaming. Yet their performance can degrade severely under network conditions where strong performance is still achievable. Identifying such conditions and quantifying the resulting performance gap is intractable by enumeration, while the sequential and closed-loop nature of RL controllers makes formal verification methods impractical. We present ReGuard, a framework that discovers worst-case scenarios for a given RL controller and protects it against them at inference time without retraining. Discovery is formulated as a bilevel regret-maximization problem, which yields a certified lower bound on the worst-case performance gap. The discovered trajectories are then analyzed as counterfactuals and compiled into lightweight logic rules that intervene only when a risky state is detected, leaving the controller's behavior unchanged otherwise. We evaluate ReGuard across three RL-based network controllers: Pensieve, Sage, and Park. ReGuard discovers scenarios in which the controller's performance is 43−64% worse than what is achievable. ReGuard not only discovers gaps 57% to 6× larger than those found by the strongest baselines but also shrinks them by 79−85% via lightweight rule-based protection while preserving nominal performance. ReGuard's protection extends beyond the scenarios it discovers, improving performance across a wider range of network conditions.
Self-triggered reinforcement learning control (RL-STC) learns the sparsest control schedule that preserves Lyapunov-decreasing stability under a Run-Time Assurance (RTA) override. We invert this: an adversarial RL agent learns the sparsest jamming or Denial-of-Service (DoS) schedule that destabilizes the closed loop, with a Lyapunov-increase admissibility predicate mirroring the defender's safety certificate. We prove a plant-property lower bound on the minimum jam count required for an immediate hold-last medium-access-control adversary to force a crash against a self-triggered controller (STC) satisfying a Lyapunov contract, and recover a certificate-level analog of the consecutive-grouping optimality of prior count-budget DoS scheduling as a corollary. This extends the DoS-scheduling count-budget analysis from periodic and linear-time-invariant to STC controllers. Empirically, we train against four fixed defenders per plant (one Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) and three RL-STC) on Pendulum, CartPole, and Quadrotor2D. The learned adversary is the only adversary that crashes every defender on every plant at 100%: greedy misses Quadrotor2D LQR on 42% of episodes and periodic misses Pendulum LQR on 97%. On jam-time-per-failure it beats baselines by up to 2.8×, and shows its widest absolute margin on Quadrotor2D LQR. Robustness ablations show that Gaussian observation noise exceeding the initial-state magnitude and position-only observation both preserve 100% failure rate and keep the learned adversary strictly ahead of both baselines on jam-time-per-failure.
Adam Haroon, Erick J. Rodríguez-Seda, Tristan Schuler +1
General-purpose congestion control algorithms (CCAs) are designed to achieve general congestion control goals, but they may not meet the specific requirements of certain users. Customized CCAs can meet certain users' specific requirements; however, non-expert users often lack the expertise to implement them. In this paper, we present an exploratory non-expert customized CCA framework, named NECC, which enables non-expert users to easily model, implement, and deploy their customized CCAs by leveraging Large Language Models and the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) interface. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address the customized CCA implementation problem. Our evaluations using real-world CCAs show that the performance of NECC is very promising, and we discuss the insights that we find and possible future research directions.