Organizations: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute · IBM Research
Abstract
Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems increasingly rely on intermediate communication to coordinate complex tasks. While most existing systems communicate through natural language, recent work shows that latent communication, particularly through transformer key-value (KV) caches, can improve efficiency and preserve richer task-relevant information. However, KV caches also encode contextual inputs, intermediate reasoning states, and agent-specific information, creating an opaque channel through which sensitive content may propagate across agents without explicit textual disclosure. To address this, we introduce \textbf{LCGuard} (Latent Communication Guard), a framework for safe KV-based latent communication in multi-agent LLM systems. LCGuard treats shared KV caches as latent working memory and learns representation-level transformations before cache artifacts are transmitted across agents. We formalize representation-level sensitive information leakage operationally through reconstruction: a shared cache artifact is unsafe if an adversarial decoder can recover agent-specific sensitive inputs from it. This leads to an adversarial training formulation in which the adversary learns to reconstruct sensitive inputs, while LCGuard learns transformations that preserve task-relevant semantics and reduce reconstructable information. Empirical evaluations across multiple model families and multi-agent benchmarks show that LCGuard consistently reduces reconstruction-based leakage and attack success rates while maintaining competitive task performance compared to standard KV-sharing baselines.
LLM agents can share more than text. In some systems, an agent can send a short visible message while also passing its full KV-cache state to another model. This hidden state can help the final model combine evidence from several agents, but it is also hard to inspect. A visible message may look harmless even if the hidden state has been changed. We study this problem in a multi-agent question-answering setup. Specialists each see part of the evidence, send a short commitment, and pass full KV-cache state to a coordinator. In clean runs, this latent collaboration improves over a matched text-only version. On transformed HiddenBench with Qwen3-4B, it reaches EM/F1 of 0.338/0.486, compared with 0.231/0.369 for text collaboration. Qwen3-8B and HotPotQA runs show the same direction of improvement. The problem appears when one specialist is malicious. Some false visible commitments can steer answers. More seriously, changing the hidden KV state can collapse performance even when the visible commitment still looks plausible. A verifier that checks only text misses this failure mode. Simple magnitude checks catch some obvious corruptions, but adaptive attacks can evade them while still damaging the final answer. The most reliable fix we find is not to guess whether hidden state looks normal, but to protect it in transport. We implement an HMAC-SHA256 manifest that binds the specialist, session, model, visible commitment, tensor metadata, and payload digest. It accepts all 774 honest replayed payloads and rejects all 295 recorded tampered payloads. The main lesson is that full-KV latent memory can be useful, but it should be treated as a security-sensitive object, not as ordinary internal model state.
Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) have become a prevailing paradigm for tackling complex reasoning, planning, and tool-use tasks. The dominant communication protocol in such systems is natural language: agents exchange messages token-by-token, verbalising their internal reasoning so that peers can read, verify, and respond. While convenient and interpretable, this protocol suffers from three structural drawbacks -- high inference cost, irreversible information loss during discretization, and ambiguity/redundancy of natural language. A growing body of work therefore explores an alternative protocol -- latent communication -- in which agents exchange continuous representations (embeddings, hidden states, or KV-caches) directly, bypassing the bottleneck of text generation. This paper presents a unified framework for organising the rapidly expanding literature on latent communication. We analyse existing methods along three orthogonal axes: (1) WHAT information is communicated (Embeddings, Hidden States, KV-Caches, or other continuous state); (2) WHICH sender-receiver alignment is used (latent-space alignment and layer alignment); and (3) HOW the communicated information is fused into the receiver (concatenation, prepending, mathematical operations, cross-attention, or cache restoration). Under this 3-axis framework, we systematically categorise eighteen representative methods proposed between 2024 and 2026, identify five major design patterns, and surface a set of open challenges -- including cross-architecture alignment, security of latent channels, compression for edge deployment, and the relationship between latent communication and latent chain-of-thought. We hope that this framework both lowers the barrier to entry for new researchers and provides a vocabulary for comparing future work.
Multi-agent LLM systems relay key--value caches instead of text and credit their gains to exchanged ``latent thoughts''. That credit is a claim about \emph{which} example's cache is relayed, not merely that one is. We audit it causally in released systems. The cache is replaced with deranged (mismatched-example), zeroed, and moment-matched random counterparts, under two regimes defined by whether the receiver needs the sender's private information. Where it does, the battery reads ceiling: 100% against 23--25% for answer-irrelevant relays on the primary backbone, a contrast replicated across three families, five checkpoints, and a prose document-QA surface. Where it does not, a pre-registered five-seed protocol establishes equivalence within 2.8 points, a margin anchored to the audited system's reported gain, under Holm-corrected TOST on GSM8K and ARC-Challenge across three Qwen3 scales and on MedQA at 8B (one cell shows a small detected advantage inside the margin); a second family shows no detected advantage. A large cache effect need not be a pairing effect. In one natural cell, zeroing the relay costs 14.7 points; a mismatched cache, 0.4. Nor is need sufficient: under the same test, delivered channels span ceiling (LatentMAS's native relay), partial (KVComm's layer subset), and no detected example-specific transfer (C2C's released projector). Benchmark deltas do not by themselves establish latent-thought transmission; establishing it takes a mismatched-cache audit, which we release.