Test-Time Collective Action: Proxy-Based Perturbations for Correcting Algorithmic Harms

As learning systems increasingly shape everyday decisions, Algorithmic Collective Action (ACA), i.e., users coordinating changes to shared data to steer model behavior, offers a complement to regulator-side policy and corporate model design. Real-world collective actions have traditionally been decentralized and fragmented into multiple collectives, despite sharing overarching objectives, with each collective differing in size, strategy, and actionable goals. However, most of the ACA literature focuses on single collective settings. To address this, we propose the first comprehensive statistical framework for ACA with multiple collectives acting on the same system. In particular, we focus on collective action in classification, studying how multiple collectives can influence a classifier's behavior. We provide quantitative statistical bounds on the success of the collectives, considering the role and the interplay of the collectives' sizes and the alignment of their goals. We make such bounds computable by each collective with only partial knowledge of other collectives' sizes and strategies. Finally, we numerically illustrate our framework on simulations inspired by interventions for climate adaptation in smart cities, demonstrating the usefulness of our bounds.

Collaborative machine learning among financial institutions must be both group-fair and robust against deliberate adversarial manipulation. Existing fairness-aware aggregation methods remain formally vulnerable to fairness poisoning: a malicious client maximizing group disparity while preserving accuracy evades accuracy-based Byzantine defenses, and in our threat model FairFed's gap-based weighting can be gamed by an adversary who observes the global fairness score. We present Fairis, a server-side reweighting scheme in which each client's update receives the normalized weight $ω_k = \bar{w}_k / \sum_j \bar{w}_j$ built from the unnormalized score $\bar{w}_k = η- \mathcal{F}_k$, with $\mathcal{F}_k \in [0,1]$ the local Equal Opportunity Difference and $η> 1$ a security parameter. We prove three properties, Monotone Weight Reduction (MWR), Demographic Participation, and Non-Gamesmanship, extend MWR to colluding minority coalitions, and show that combining MWR with server-side norm clipping bounds the adversary's displacement of the global model by $ω_0 C$, strictly decreasing in its own reported disparity. Assuming honest score reporting, an assumption this paper does not discharge, Fairis is the only rule evaluated that guarantees every client strictly positive weight while provably reducing an adversary's weight monotonically in its bias; clipped FairFed can reach a lower weight but guarantees nothing and zeroes a client outright on Taiwan Credit. Against an adversary stealthy enough to evade accuracy-based defenses, within 0.04 accuracy of benign, Fairis cuts its weight by 41 to 54% below a size-blind control on Taiwan. On routine non-IID partitions no rule dominates, and a uniform-weighting ablation shows that containment tracks how far the adversary's score separates from the honest mean, providing none when the honest population is already unfair.

Machine learning algorithms in socially sensitive domains (e.g., credit decisions) often focus on equalizing predictive outcomes. However, satisfying these metrics does not guarantee that models use the same reasoning for different groups. We show that existing outcome-fair models can still apply fundamentally different reasoning to individuals, a hidden procedural bias'' missed by standard fairness metrics and algorithms. We propose Counterfactual Explanation Consistency (CEC), a framework that detects and mitigates this bias by aligning feature attributions between individuals and their counterfactual counterparts. Key contributions include a nearest-neighbor counterfactual generation method, a modified baseline for integrated gradient comparisons, an individual-level procedural fairness metric, and a corresponding training loss. We introduce a taxonomy identifying Regime B'' (same outcome, different reasoning) as a critical blind spot. Experiments on synthetic data, German Credit, Adult Income, and HMDA mortgage data demonstrate that outcome-fair baselines exhibit substantial hidden bias, while CEC substantially reduces it with modest utility cost.