A Statistical Framework for Algorithmic Collective Action with Multiple Collectives

When machine learning systems under-perform for particular subgroups, affected users typically have no way to correct these disparities without relying on platform-level fixes. Existing approaches to algorithmic fairness rely on provider-centric approaches to correct these failures, leaving users with no external lever when faced with harm. Recent work in Algorithmic Collective Action shows that coordinated users can steer an algorithmic system toward a collective goal, but the existing mechanisms require the provider to retrain on the collective's modified data which users may not have control over. We propose Test-Time Collective Action (TTCA), a framework through which a group of users who share query access to the platform, can correct disparities affecting under-served subgroup without participating in the platform's training loop. We implement this through a proxy-based mechanism where the collective pools query access to a black-box API to extract a proxy of the platform, then optimizes a per-class universal perturbation against the proxy. Each member applies this perturbation to their own inputs at submission time, requiring no cooperation from the platform. We empirically evaluate the mechanism on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and FairFace, showing that modestly-sized collectives close most of the subgroup accuracy gap, transfer across architectures (a small proxy can attack a larger platform), and improve worst-group accuracy, equal-opportunity gap, and disparate impact. A query-budget analysis comparing a per-user black-box attack baseline shows that pooling is cheaper than each subgroup member attacking alone. Test-time collective action thus offers corrective intervention to users when platform-side remediation is unavailable or delayed.

A key challenge for the safety of advanced AI systems is the possibility that multiple simpler agents might inadvertently form a collective agent with capabilities and goals distinct from those of any individual. More generally, determining when a group of agents can be viewed as a unified collective agent is a foundational question in the study of interactions and incentives in both biological and artificial systems. We adopt a behavioral perspective in answering this question, ascribing collective agency to a group when viewing the group's joint actions as rational and goal-directed successfully predicts its behavior. We formalize this perspective on collective agency using causal games -- which are causal models of strategic, multi-agent interactions -- and causal abstraction -- which formalizes when a simple, high-level model faithfully captures a more complex, low-level model. We use this framework to solve a puzzle regarding multi-agent incentives in actor-critic models and to make quantitative assessments of the degree of collective agency exhibited by different voting mechanisms. Our framework aims to provide a foundation for theoretical and empirical work to understand, predict, and control emergent collective agents in multi-agent AI systems.

Collective artificial intelligence, where multiple agents work on shared tasks, holds potential to solve expansive problems in fields from medicine to collective governance. But while prescriptive engineering solutions abound, we lack descriptive scientific understanding of artificial collectives, and therefore principles for how to design resource efficient multi-agent systems. Through systematic experiments with optimizing agents, we characterize how agent interpretive abilities, rationality bounds, and task qualities interact to shape collective performance. Agents range from specialists, with narrow interpretive abilities, to generalists, with broad ones. Collectives of specialists correspond to sparse, centralized networks, while collectives of generalists correspond to dense, decentralized ones. We show that interpretive network properties have small performance effects on average (0.07 standard deviations of performance). However, for specific task qualities, these effects are 4.5 times larger (0.33 sd) and can reach much higher for certain task qualities (1.84 sd). This leads collectives of generalists to perform better on tasks that involve generating, choosing, and coordinating, while collectives of specialists with a few generalist mediators perform better on tasks that involve negotiating. Rationality bounds then moderate these relationships. At loose bounds, specialists outperform generalists through more effective sampling of high-dimensional decision spaces. At tight bounds, generalists outperform specialists through better gradient estimation. A fundamental trade-off between performance and convergence speed emerges at moderate bounds. These findings suggest that multi-agent design could benefit from matching interpretive networks to both task demands and agents' computational limits, with implications for the efficiency and energy costs of multi-agent systems.