AI, Take the Wheel: What Drives Delegation and Trust in Human-Computer Cooperative Question Answering?

AI agents that plan, retain memory across sessions, invoke external tools and act with partial autonomy are transforming human--AI collaboration. Research on affective computing, simulated empathy in large language models, trust in automation and AI safety has illuminated important design principles, yet these literatures remain fragmented. No integrated account explains how affective cues operate within agentic collaboration -- settings in which humans delegate, monitor and correct consequential tasks. This Review synthesises computational and interactional mechanisms of affective dynamics: the processes through which affective cues, emotion-like behaviour and perceived agent affect shape trust calibration, delegation decisions, error correction, dependence and governance. We trace how model-generated affective signals enter interaction loops that govern reliance, repair and oversight, and propose a framework that treats affect not as an internal property of AI but as a coordination layer through which humans and agents negotiate capability, uncertainty and responsibility. The framework provides a foundation for calibrated measurement, purposeful design and informed governance.

As language-model agents increasingly work in teams, each agent must decide how much to trust its teammates. Yet we lack a standard way to measure trust between AI agents. We propose a behavioral measure based on costly verification. In a cooperative survival game, checking a teammate's work consumes resources, while trusting a wrong answer can be fatal. Relative to a memoryless version of the same model, reduced verification provides an observable measure of trust. Using this framework, we study trust formation, breakage, and recovery across six frontier model snapshots. When paired with a consistently reliable teammate, four snapshots (Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.1, and Gemini 3.1 Pro) reduce verification by roughly 60-85%, whereas two smaller snapshots show little or no such adjustment. Failures reverse this discount, but models differ in how they respond. Some concentrate renewed scrutiny on the culprit, while others become more cautious toward the entire team. Recovery is slower than formation, and clustered failures sustain suspicion far longer than the same number of failures spread apart. These differences have practical consequences. Models that form trust verify less, decide more quickly, and achieve higher payoffs in our environment. By contrast, persistent over-verification is associated with indecision rather than safety. Our results show that trust dispositions can be measured before deployment and suggest that calibration, rather than maximal suspicion, should be the central concern in the governance of multi-agent AI systems.

Human-AI teams fail to outperform their best member in 70% of studies, yet no theory specifies when complementarity is achievable. We derive tight bounds for the broad class of confidence-based aggregation rules by integrating signal detection theory with information-theoretic analysis, yielding four results: (1) a complementarity theorem (teams outperform individuals iff error correlation $ρ_{HM} < ρ^*$, with $ρ^* \approx a$ in the symmetric near-chance regime); (2) minimax bounds showing gains scale as $Θ(\sqrt{Δd})$ with metacognitive sensitivity difference; (3) an impossibility result proving no confidence-based aggregation rule achieves complementarity when $ρ_{HM} \geq ρ^*$; and (4) multi-class generalization $ρ^*_K \approx ρ^*/\sqrt{K-1}$. Predictions match observed team accuracy ($R = 0.94$ on ImageNet-16H, $R = 0.91$ on CIFAR-10H) and the multi-class threshold scaling holds on human data ($R = 0.93$, $K = 16$), with robustness under non-Gaussian distributions. The framework explains why complementarity is rare and provides actionable design formulas; results apply to aggregation, not to interactive deliberation that generates novel answers.