Discovering Cooperative Pipelines: Autoresearch for Sequential Social Dilemmas

We propose an LLM harness that generates code-based policy functions for multi-agent environments, evaluates them with self-play, and refines them using feedback from previous iterations. Following the recent line of work in feedback engineering (the design of which information signals are shown to the LLM during refinement), we compare sparse feedback (scalar reward only) with dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). In two Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and with two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback improves over or matches sparse feedback on all metrics. We explain this asymmetry via feedback aliasing: when the scalar reward maps distinct failure modes into the same value (e.g., under- vs. over-cleaning), social metrics disambiguate and allow the LLM to diagnose which direction of improvement to take. We conclude that social metrics act as a coordination signal, leading to strategies such as Voronoi territory partitioning and adaptive cleaner schedules. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents in equilibrium. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become more effective under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

LLM-powered multi-agent systems can now automate the full research pipeline from ideation to paper writing, but a fundamental question remains: automation for whom? Researchers operate under different resource configurations, hold different methodological preferences, and target different output formats. A system that produces uniform outputs regardless of these differences will systematically under-serve every individual user, making personalization a precondition for research automation to be genuinely usable. However, achieving it requires three capabilities that current systems lack: accumulating reusable procedural knowledge across projects, retaining user-specific experience across sessions, and internalizing implicit preferences that resist explicit formalization. We propose NanoResearch, a multi-agent framework that addresses these gaps through tri-level co-evolution. A skill bank distills recurring operations into compact procedural rules reusable across projects. A memory module maintains user- and project-specific experience that grounds planning decisions in each user's research history. A label-free policy learning converts free-form feedback into persistent parameter updates of the planner, reshaping subsequent coordination. These three layers co-evolve: reliable skills produce richer memory, richer memory informs better planning, and preference internalization continuously realigns the loop to each user. Extensive experiments demonstrate that NanoResearch delivers substantial gains over state-of-the-art AI research systems, and progressively refines itself to produce better research at lower cost over successive cycles.