PokerSkill: LLMs Can Play Expert-Level Poker without Training or Solvers
Authors: Boning Li, Baoxiang Wang, Longbo Huang
Organizations: IIIS, Tsinghua University · The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
Abstract
Poker is a landmark challenge for artificial intelligence. The dominant approach relies on equilibrium solvers built on counterfactual regret minimization, requiring millions of core-hours of training. Large Language Models (LLMs) possess extensive poker knowledge but perform far below solver-based agents when asked to play directly. Traditional rule-based poker agents are interpretable and training-free, but their strategic ceiling remains far below equilibrium play. We introduce \textbf{PokerSkill}, a training-free and solver-free framework that bridges this gap by using detailed rule-based poker skills as a structured action-grounding interface for LLMs. A deterministic context engine analyzes the current state and retrieves only the relevant fragments from a layered skill library, which is entirely designed by human poker experts, constraining the LLM's choice to reasonable actions. Against GTOWizard, a state-of-the-art GTO benchmark, GPT-5.5 XHigh with PokerSkill achieves −57±21 mbb/hand, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves −80±29 mbb/hand and Claude Opus 4.7 achieves −87±64 mbb/hand, reducing losses by 49--61% compared to default-prompt baselines and outperforming the strong bot Slumbot. Our key finding is that rule-based skills alone do not constitute a strong strategy, and LLMs alone cannot play well, but their combination yields an agent that requires neither training nor solver access yet competes with systems built on millions of core-hours of computation. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an LLM achieving competitive performance in a complex imperfect-information game without game-specific training or solver queries. Code is available at https://github.com/lbn187/PokerSkill.
Strategic reasoning under uncertainty underpins consequential decisions in negotiation, finance, and policy, but prevailing game-play benchmarks collapse heterogeneous reasoning dimensions into a single scalar, leaving the capability structure of frontier LLMs unexamined. We introduce Poker Arena, a no-limit Texas Hold'em tournament platform that couples a three-layer memory architecture (within-hand, session, and cross-session) with a nine-axis cognitive profile decomposing strategic reasoning into interpretable dimensions such as bet-sizing calibration and positional awareness. We evaluate seven frontier models across 50 sessions of 1,000 hands and a controlled memory ablation; tournament chips and aggregate axis score order the field differently: Claude Opus 4.6 wins +$15,730 chips with 14 first-place finishes, yet ranks only fifth of seven on mean axis score, while persistent memory helps some models and hurts others. These findings show that multi-axis evaluation surfaces capability structure that scalar leaderboards systematically misrank, with cross-dimensional consistency outweighing peak performance on any single axis.
Poker is an imperfect information game that has served as a long-standing benchmark for decision-making under uncertainty. To maximize utility beyond the Nash equilibrium, an agent can deviate from Nash-equilibrium policies to exploit suboptimal play. We introduce AlphaExploitem, which extends the competitive RL poker agent AlphaHoldem by using a hierarchical transformer encoder that enables reasoning over previously played hands and modifying the training procedure with the inclusion of a diverse pool of exploitable opponents to facilitate learning to exploit. We train and evaluate AlphaExploitem on two standard benchmarks for imperfect-information games. Empirically, AlphaExploitem successfully exploits weak play by both in- and out-of-distribution opponents, without losing performance against NE opponents.
Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over \textbf{250 million mixed-strategy decisions}; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the ℓ1 distance to the equilibrium by 52.6%} across 8 different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.