Language Models Can Resolve Reference Compositionally, But It's Not Their Native Strength: The Case of the Personal Relation Task

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

The interpretation of implicit meanings is an integral aspect of human communication. However, this framework may not transfer to interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs). To investigate this, we introduce the task of Implicit Information Extraction (IIE) and propose an LLM-based IIE pipeline that builds a structured knowledge graph from a context sentence by extracting relational triplets, validating implicit inferences, and analyzing temporal relations. We evaluate two LLMs against crowdsourced human judgments on two datasets. We find that humans agree with most model triplets yet consistently propose many additions, indicating limited coverage in current LLM-based IIE. Moreover, in our experiments, models appear to be more conservative about implicit inferences than humans in socially rich contexts, whereas humans become more conservative in shorter, fact-oriented contexts. Our code is available at https://github.com/Antonio-Dee/IIE_from_LLM.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests, prompting debate about the nature and validity of the underlying capabilities. At the same time, reasoning-oriented LLMs trained via reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards have demonstrated notable improvements across a range of benchmarks. In this work, we examine the behavior of such reasoning models in ToM tasks using novel adaptations of machine psychological experiments together with results from established benchmarks. We observe that reasoning models consistently exhibit increased robustness to prompt variations and task perturbations. Our analysis suggests these gains come at least partly from models being more robust at reaching the correct answer under prompt and task variation. We read this as evidence for a robustness-based account rather than for a new ToM-specific ability.