Frontier AI governance often centres on the model-level governance paradigm, which assumes that a model's capability profile is primarily a function of the compute and data used during training. This position paper argues that model-level governance becomes less effective when capability progress is increasingly driven by "non-model gains"--improvements that are independent from advances in the base model. We formalise the concept of non-model gains and provide a taxonomy of three distinct vectors of capability gain: inference gain (scaling compute at test-time), systems gain (post-training enhancements such as scaffolds), and asset gain (enhancing a model with restricted assets). We demonstrate how these vectors--alongside potential future impacts from embodiment, continual learning, and AI diffusion--may undermine risk management strategies that hinge mostly on pre-deployment evaluation and mitigation. We provide an overview of governance approaches that go beyond the model level: system, entity, agent, and cloud governance. Finally, we emphasise the importance of societal resilience as a complement to these governance layers.
Every system that performs effects has two boundaries: what it can do (expressiveness) and what governance covers (governance). In nearly all deployed AI systems, these boundaries are defined independently, creating three regions: governed capabilities (the only useful region), ungoverned capabilities (risk), and governance policies that address non-existent capabilities (theater). Two of the three regions are failure modes. We focus on the governance of effects: actions that AI systems perform in the world (API calls, database writes, tool invocations). This is distinct from the governance of model outputs (content quality, bias, fairness), which operates at a different level and requires different mechanisms. We present a formal framework for analyzing this structural gap. Rice's theorem (1953) proves the gap is undecidable in the general case for any Turing-complete architecture that attempts to govern effects behaviorally: no algorithm can decide non-trivial semantic properties of arbitrary programs, including the property "this program's effects comply with the governance policy." We define coterminous governance: a system property where the expressivenessboundary equals the governance boundary. We show that coterminous governance requires an architectural decision (separatingcomputation from effect) rather than a governance layer added after the fact. We show that structural governance under this separation subsumes separate governance infrastructure: governance checks become part of the execution pipeline rather than a second system running alongside it. We propose coterminous governance as the testable criterion for any AI governance system: either the two boundaries are provably identical, or risk and theater are structurally inevitable. Proofs are mechanized in Coq (454 theorems, 36 modules, 0 admitted).
Compute governance today is a governance of training: the thresholds, reporting requirements, and frontier-AI regimes now in force attach to training compute and treat the trained model as the regulatory unit. That picture is incomplete: capability increasingly migrates to the deployment stage through inference-time scaling, agentic scaffolding, and compression onto consumer hardware. This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call. We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each rated on a four-point readiness scale against a documented four-vendor evidence base. We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model (three capability tiers crossed with four adversary roles) and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios (domestic regulation, bilateral or multilateral coordination, industry self-regulation, and compute-marketplace governance). Fifteen of the twenty mechanisms have commercial technical substrates in production today, although governance-grade assurance and adversarial robustness vary substantially. The adversary analysis shows that this readiness holds only against a cooperative deployer and a low-to-medium-capability user: no mechanism rates adequate against a high-capability state-level deployer, and fine-tuning removes the model-internal components of the enforcement cluster, although platform-external controls can persist. A substitution analysis connects the taxonomy to a companion hardware paper as a conditional substitution principle describing when inference-stage and hardware-stage mechanisms provide comparable regulatory coverage under stated conditions. A second-rater reliability check on a random subset of the readiness ratings returned a quadratic-weighted Cohen's kappa of 0.74.
This paper examines where final authority should sit once capable AI systems are embedded in organizational workflows. It compares two governance models. The first, frontier-provider sovereignty, assigns privileged authority to the provider of the most capable models and is reflected in contemporary arguments for frontier-model testing, release gating, transparency duties, and compute-related controls. The second, action-centered deployer sovereignty, places final authority over high-impact actions with the organization that authorizes the action, embeds it in a business process, and bears the downstream legal, operational, and commercial consequences. The paper combines comparative reading of public governance frameworks with implementation-informed analysis of runtime heterogeneity and enterprise control requirements. It compares EU AI Act guidance, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, recent Japanese AI policy instruments, and Canada's voluntary code and managerial guidance. Across these materials, the paper finds stronger support for distributed operational accountability than for unilateral frontier-provider control. It further argues that rapid enterprise adoption, declining provider transparency, and widening control gaps increase the value of a portable governance layer centered on governed action rather than on provider-native session objects. The conclusion is layered rather than absolutist: strong upstream authority remains justified for frontier capability gating, but final authority over concrete enterprise action is better located with the deployer and consequence-bearer.