POIROT: Interrogating Agents for Failure Detection in Multi-Agent Systems

Large language model (LLM) based multi-agent systems enable complex problem solving through coordinated reasoning and action, but their distributed structure also introduces new challenges in diagnosing system-level failures. When an execution fails, identifying which agent is responsible and at what point the trajectory first becomes irreversibly misdirected is difficult due to long-horizon interactions and tightly coupled agent behaviors. In this paper, we study the problem of failure localization in LLM-based multi-agent systems and present AgentLocate, a framework that attributes failures to both a specific agent and the earliest decisive step. AgentLocate combines an LLM-based judging mechanism with multi-perspective verification by independent evaluators, whose assessments are aggregated using a confidence-aware strategy. The resulting feedback is further used to adapt the judge through lightweight fine-tuning, improving attribution quality. We evaluate AgentLocate on two complementary benchmarks covering diverse tasks, agent configurations, and trajectory lengths. Experimental results show that AgentLocate consistently outperforms existing failure localization methods in identifying both responsible agents and failure steps, while remaining efficient in terms of token usage and running time.

LLM multi-agent systems suffer from Correctness Collapse, where high task-level accuracy conceals severe process-level failures. This is especially hazardous in safety-critical embodied settings such as automotive cockpits, where lexically correct utterances may trigger dangerous physical operations. Existing attribution methods rely on text traces alone, missing dependency structure, multi-channel evidence, and safety-aware evaluation. We introduce CockpitHAT, a hierarchical attribution framework that replaces positional windows with dependency-distance thresholds from interaction DAGs, integrates multi-channel evidence via an embodied adapter, and applies a safety-uplift to high-risk failures during confidence-weighted analyst consensus. We further release CockpitBench, a benchmark of 212 annotated failure traces spanning dialogue, vehicle-state, environmental, and memory channels, each labeled with ISO 26262 ASIL severity via three-expert consensus. On the public Who&When benchmark, CockpitHAT achieves agent-level / step-exact accuracies of 77.9% / 37.8% on the Hand-Crafted split and 86.5% / 46.0% on the Algorithm-Generated split, surpassing the text-only SOTA ECHO by up to 17.6 / 16.7 points. On CockpitBench, it attains 78.3% agent-level and 38.2% step-exact accuracy. These results establish dependency-aware, multi-channel, risk-calibrated attribution as an effective paradigm for reliable failure diagnosis in real-world embodied LLM multi-agent systems.

Safe agents can fail together. Multi-agent LLM systems (MAS) move information, state, decisions, and authority across principal boundaries, creating failures that local checks may miss. Without an execution-level view, a multi-agent setting can easily be mistaken for evidence of a genuinely multi-agent security effect. We thus systematize MAS security through an execution-centered analysis of 197 works, covering six interaction interfaces, four adversary positions, seven system-level risks, and eight recurring attack paths. We introduce an A-I-R framework that organizes attacks by adversary position, interaction interface, and resulting system-level risk, unifying otherwise fragmented attack mechanisms across MAS. We organize defenses through a five-part contract covering path target, observation, intervention, trust boundary, and recovery, and identify path closure and recovery as key challenges. We audit 44 evaluation and benchmark works and identify open challenges in isolating interaction effects, designing comparable and diagnostic metrics, supporting reuse across MAS designs, and evaluating open-system operation. Together, these findings motivate an interaction-aware view of MAS security: trace attacks end to end, test whether defenses close those paths, and evaluate system-level effects with appropriate counterfactuals.