Self-Commitment Latency: A Reward-Free Probe for Prompted Implicit Hacking

Large language models often answer complex reasoning questions without revealing intermediate steps, raising whether they reason latently or complete patterns. We propose the Hidden CoT Detection Score (HCDS), a comparative behavioral and mechanistic signal measuring whether neutral-prompt behavior aligns more closely with explicit CoT or explicit no- CoT. Here, hidden CoT operationally denotes this neutral-prompt CoT-like alignment; HCDS does not directly observe or prove an unexposed reasoning trace. On GSM8K, HCDS is significantly positive for both Qwen3-4B variants (Thinking $+1.87$, $p = 1.2 \times 10^{-7}$; Instruct $+1.41$, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-4}$), replicates across a different inference stack and quantization within $0.08$ ($+1.80$ and $+1.45$), and is not significantly positive in seven of eight length-adjusted calibration-control cells. The unadjusted score produces large positive scores on single-step arithmetic and numeric factual lookup. The variants also respond differently to no-CoT instructions: Instruct complies from the prompt alone, whereas Thinking continues reasoning and requires intervention. These findings show stronger, less prompt-conditional CoT-like behavior in the reasoning-tuned model, consistent with but not proof of latent reasoning. HCDS thus investigates latent reasoning without relying on models' self-reported traces.

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Recent work trains reasoning models with length penalties to curb overthinking and cut inference cost. We show that these penalties make the chain of thought less monitorable. A length-compressed model still lets misleading hints steer its answers, but it less often verbalizes their influence. We train Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-14B with reinforcement learning under length penalties targeting 60% down to 30% of baseline chain-of-thought length, then evaluate them with nine types of biasing hints on held-out MMLU-Pro-R and four transfer benchmarks. A chain is faithful when an LLM monitor can tell from it that the hint influenced the answer. At the 30% target, accuracy stays near baseline and wrong-answer hints switch answers as often as before. Yet faithfulness drops on every evaluation set for both models, by 39% for Qwen3-14B and 35% for Qwen3-4B on MMLU-Pro-R. A control trained with the same correctness and format rewards but no length penalty leaves faithfulness intact or raises it. Shortening alone does not explain the drop. Compressed chains mention the hint 7 to 35 percentage points less often than the uncompressed model's chains shortened to the same length by random sentence deletion, across both model sizes and all five evaluation sets. Length penalties therefore trade monitorability for inference cost by removing the evidence monitors depend on.