cs.AIJun 4, 2026
SaveEvaluating Agentic Configuration Repair for Computer Networks
Abstract
Misconfigurations in computer networks remain a major source of critical Internet outages. Research is turning to Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate the complex, error-prone task of network configuration. However, even state-of-the-art models fail to resolve misconfigurations in large-scale, complex scenarios and often introduce new errors. In this work, we benchmark open- and closed-source LLMs augmented with formal network verification and context retrieval tools. We demonstrate that agentic architectures outperform base LLMs in repair efficacy (by 12% on average) and safety (by 17% on average), enabled by the ability to dynamically manage context and iteratively validate configuration repairs.
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SADE: Symptom-Aware Diagnostic Escalation for LLM-Based Network Troubleshooting
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NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations
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