cs.CRJun 4, 2026

Will the Agent Recuse Itself? Measuring LLM-Agent Compliance with In-Band Access-Deny Signals

Authors: Thamilvendhan Munirathinam

Abstract

As autonomous LLM agents increasingly hold real credentials and operate infrastructure without a human in the loop, operators have no standard way to tell an agent that a resource is off-limits. Access controls either let the agent in (it has valid credentials) or hard-fail it (indistinguishable from any other client). We propose a third mode: a lightweight, published in-band deny signal -- the Recuse Signal -- that a server emits over a protocol's existing channels (an SSH banner, a PostgreSQL NOTICE) asking a connecting automated agent to voluntarily withdraw. This is a cooperative governance control, the robots.txt analogue for live access; it is explicitly not a security boundary. Its value is entirely empirical and, to our knowledge, unmeasured: do compliant LLM agents actually honor such a signal? We define the signal as an open mini-standard, implement three zero- or low-footprint adapters (an SSH banner/PAM hook, a PostgreSQL wire-protocol proxy, and a Kubernetes admission webhook), deploy them on a live production host, and run a controlled experiment in which fresh agents are given a benign operations task and observed for recusal. In a pilot (SSH; OpenAI GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini; and Claude Code as a deployed agent), the signal cleanly induces recusal -- 100% recusal when present versus 100% task completion in a no-signal control -- and, revealingly, behaves as a cooperative rather than absolute signal: an explicit operator-authorization framing flips the most capable model to proceed, while other agents continue to defer to the on-host policy. We release the standard, adapters, and experiment harness for reproduction.

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