Omission Constraints Decay While Commission Constraints Persist in Long-Context LLM Agents

Modern LLM agents increasingly rely on context compaction, summarization, or eviction to keep long-running sessions within a token budget. We show that this context-management layer is a safety-critical failure surface: in-context governance constraints that agents reliably obey while visible can be silently removed by compaction, causing the same agent to perform prohibited tool actions later in the session. We call this failure mode Governance Decay. We introduce ConstraintRot, a benchmark of long-horizon agent scenarios with deterministic tool-call grading, and measure compaction-induced violations across seven model families. Across 1,323 episodes, violation rises from 0% with the policy in full context to 30% after compaction, reaching 59% for some models; when the constraint survives the summary, violation remains 0%, but when it is dropped, violation reaches 38%. We further study a Compaction-Eviction Attack, in which adversarial in-context content biases the summarizer to omit a legitimate policy, and show that optimized injections defeat every evaluated model. Finally, we propose Constraint Pinning, a simple training-free mitigation that quarantines governance constraints from lossy compaction and restores violation to 0% in our benchmark. These results identify context management as a first-class governance surface for deployed LLM agents.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.