Byzantine Cheap Talk: Adversarial Resilience and Topology Effects in LLM Coordination Games
Authors: Aya El Mir, Martin Takáč, Salem Lahlou
Organizations: Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI), Abu Dhabi, UAE
Abstract
Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly rely on communication protocols for coordination, yet their robustness under adversarial and structural constraints remains poorly understood. Building on prior work showing that cheap-talk channels enable cooperation in LLM coordination games, we investigate two vulnerability classes in a 4-player Stag Hunt across six model families and 720 trials. First, when Byzantine agents signal cooperation but defect, non-Byzantine agents detect the betrayal within one round yet fail to adapt collectively: a substantial fraction continue cooperating despite repeated exploitation, unable to recover coordination due to the game's unanimity payoff structure. Second, explicitly restricting communication topology collapses cooperation, while applying identical restrictions silently preserves near-perfect cooperation. This establishes that coordination failure stems from agents' meta-reasoning about hidden information, not information loss itself. We identify two stable behavioral archetypes that replicate across all model cohorts: Defection-Prone models that switch permanently after betrayal, and Cooperation-Persistent models that continue cooperating at significant individual cost. These findings reveal concrete security vulnerabilities: communication channels can be exploited as adversarial injection vectors, and disclosing network topology to agents can degrade coordination even without any adversary present.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly collaborate over peer-to-peer networks to improve their reliability. However, these same interactions can also become a source of vulnerability, as unreliable or Byzantine agents may sway neighboring agents toward incorrect conclusions and degrade overall system performance. Existing methods rely on leader-based coordination or self-reported confidence, both of which are susceptible to adversarial manipulation. We study decentralized LLM multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS) and propose Self-Anchored Consensus (SAC), a fully decentralized iterative filter-and-refine protocol in which agents iteratively exchange responses, locally evaluate and filter unreliable messages, and refine their own outputs. We present (F+1)-robustness conditions for the communication graph that ensure honest agents preserve and propagate reliable information despite Byzantine influence. Experiments on mathematical and commonsense reasoning benchmarks show that SAC effectively suppresses Byzantine influence and consistently improves performance across diverse communication topologies, whereas prior methods degrade under adversarial conditions.
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents in equilibrium. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become more effective under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.
Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems where they must coordinate and agree on shared decisions. We ask whether classical resilient consensus theory, developed for deterministic agents, transfers to LLM agents that may behave adversarially. Framing LLM agreement as a Byzantine consensus game, we run controlled experiments on complete and general communication graphs. We find that prompted LLM agents fail to reach agreement that is achievable in principle: consensus can fail even in settings where classical theory guarantees that a convergent algorithm exists, and this failure persists across temperatures and horizons. At the same time, wrapping the agents with classical resilient consensus filters improves agreement. The benefit of filtering depends on how much robustness the underlying topology already provides. Our results suggest that classical resilient consensus theory is a useful lens for the safety of agentic AI.