Supply Chain Finance (SCF) and LendTech platforms need credit scoring systems that respond to evolving transaction behavior, repayment delays, and active exposure. We propose TRUST-SCF, a transformer-based framework for transaction-level risk prediction and dynamic credit scoring. Each user history is represented as a sequence of transaction tokens containing utilization, repayment delay and transaction position. The main contributions are: (1) a financially aligned attention bias that combines utilization similarity and recency, enabling the model to compare repayment behavior under comparable exposure conditions; (2) continuous repayment-delay prediction in a log-transformed target space, reducing the influence of extreme delays while improving sensitivity to short-delay behavior and (3) a label-efficient credit-scoring pipeline in which the final credit score is not trained using any explicit external credit-score label, but is instead derived from predicted delay, potential risk over simulated utilization, actual unpaid exposure, and nonlinear calibration. Experiments on real transaction data from more than 300,000 transactions show that TRUST-SCF improves delay prediction over sequential baselines and produces scores that are strongly associated with future repayment behavior. These results suggest that TRUST-SCF is a practical framework for adaptive credit scoring and transaction-level risk mitigation in SCF and LendTech environments.
Corporate default prediction is a core problem in financial risk management, yet traditional credit models rely heavily on financial statements that are often sparse or unavailable for many firms. Corporate transaction networks offer a complementary view of real economic activity, but how risk propagates through buyer-seller relationships remains underexplored. We conduct a large-scale empirical study using real-world electronic tax-invoice data spanning six years that links transaction histories with default events, revealing that transaction-driven risk is both role-dependent (buyer or seller) and scale-dependent. Based on these findings, we construct multiplex buyer-view and seller-view transaction networks and propose DefaultGNN, a dual-perspective graph neural network-based framework for corporate default prediction. DefaultGNN integrates both views to model how risk flows through transactional relationships, achieving strong improvements over both attribute-based and graph-based baselines, especially for firms with limited intrinsic risk signals. We further provide interpretable network-based explanations by visualizing how distressed trading partners contribute to default risk. In collaboration with a licensed credit rating agency, we validate that DefaultGNN's predictions complement existing credit scoring models, improving approval rates by 7-11%p without increasing default risk among approved firms. The source code can be found at https://github.com/jhkim611/DefaultGNN
Credit scoring increasingly relies on models whose decision logic cannot be read off their parameters, in tension with supervisory expectations that adverse decisions be explainable. A common proposal closes that gap with a language model: compute feature attributions, hand them to an LLM, and let it write the rationale. We build such a system end to end and test whether the second half of the promise holds. The predictive component is a multi-scale stacking ensemble fusing four differently regularised gradient-boosting learners with a residual network through a neural meta-learner trained on out-of-fold predictions. On a public 32,581-application credit dataset it reaches test ROC-AUC 0.9539 (95% CI [0.9462, 0.9616]) and PR-AUC 0.9137, beating the best single model by Delta-AUC = 0.0143 (p = 0.016 under a conservative independence assumption). Our central finding is asymmetric. The ranking gain is real but operationally small: at the F1-optimal threshold the ensemble avoids only six additional missed defaults out of 1,422 against a tuned random forest, cutting cost-weighted loss by under 2%. The narrative layer fails in a way prompt engineering alone does not fix. In an audited case the model named three factors as risk-increasing that the supplied attributions scored as risk-reducing, omitted the dominant driver, and introduced a feature never given to it. We trace this to properties we measure rather than assume: SHAP and LIME agree on which features matter (overlap@10 = 0.80) but not on their order (tau = 0.43, p = 0.18), and the attribution sign for the model's most sensitive input is near a coin flip across applicants (modal-sign share 0.53). Calibration (ECS = 0.117) and perturbation stability (DPD = 0.078) both fall short of our own thresholds. Constrained prompting is necessary but not sufficient: grounding must be verified after generation, not assumed.
Machine learning-based credit scoring is increasingly central to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending, yet its resilience to adversarial manipulation, where applicants strategically alter self-reported inputs to secure favourable decisions, remains poorly understood. Most adversarial-robustness evidence comes from image and text domains and evaluates a single attack against a matching defence, offering little guidance on how defences generalise across attack types in tabular credit data. We address this with a systematic train-test robustness benchmark on a large Lending Club subset, spanning three model families (logistic regression, a feed-forward neural network, and a transformer for tabular data) and four attacks confined to applicant-mutable features: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Salt-and-Pepper (S&P) noise, and DeepFool, plus a mixed-attack regime. Across a full grid evaluated with stratified cross-validation, adversarial training sharply improves robustness against the attack it is trained on and transfers well within the gradient-based family, but transfers weakly to non-gradient corruption, so single-attack defences overstate real-world resilience. Mixed training delivers the most balanced robustness across heterogeneous attacks while preserving clean-test performance, supporting multi-attack stress testing in credit-model governance.
Gijs A. F. Niewzwaag, Marijn G. S. Veth, Manuele Massei +1