Decision-making under risk is typically studied through single-shot lottery choices. Yet many real decisions involve combinatorial risk, where risk arises from multiple risky components, so the lottery over outcomes is induced rather than given outright and can be costly to evaluate exactly. We introduce an investment-allocation task to study decision under combinatorial risk, where investing in a component raises its success probability and thereby reshapes the outcome distribution. Participants favor the option with the larger probability increment, and, when increments are equal, the option with the higher initial success probability. Revealing the induced probability mass function (PMF) substantially changes behavior, making participants less responsive to combinatorial-risk features and reducing choice variance. To explain these patterns, we move beyond standard benchmarks and hand-crafted hypotheses with symbolic regression to discover compact descriptive models. The discovered models rely mainly on combinatorial-risk features, such as the after-investment success probability, rather than exact evaluation of the full induced distribution. Behavior under the displayed PMF is then well explained by augmenting this model with a prospect-theoretic residual model. The results show that people navigate combinatorial risk primarily through its core features, shifting toward lottery valuation only when the induced PMF is displayed.
LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.
As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision support, it is important to understand whether their choices under uncertainty exhibit stable and interpretable behavioural regularities. Human decision-making combines relatively persistent risk preferences with context-dependent adjustment, yet it remains unclear whether analogous behavioural structure can be observed in LLM-based decision systems. Here we examine this question using a controlled multi-model framework based on no-limit Texas Hold'em, where behaviour is quantified by Participation, measuring voluntary engagement in uncertain opportunities, and Proactiveness, measuring pre-flop risk escalation. Across homogeneous self-play and heterogeneous mixed-model interactions, frontier LLMs exhibit stable, model-specific risk profiles, forming a spectrum from conservative to aggressive decision styles. These profiles remain largely robust under changing opponent composition, while the most conservative and most aggressive models diverge further in mixed settings. Under global risk pressure and personal resource constraint, models adapt in structured but heterogeneous ways, ranging from broad behavioural contraction to selective de-escalation and near-invariant behaviour. These findings suggest that LLMs differ not only in baseline risk disposition, but also in the risk signals they respond to and the flexibility with which they adjust, providing a behavioural basis for auditing risk-sensitive decision-making in interactive settings. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/XuankunRong/AgentTexasPoker.
Reducing the number of focal elements of a mass function is classically driven by an intrinsic distance, such as Jaccard or Jousselme, that keeps the approximation close to the original as a body of evidence. We consider instead the case where the mass function feeds a linear combinatorial optimisation problem with evidential costs. What should then be preserved is not the closeness of the two mass functions, but the quality of the decision they induce. We introduce a decision-aware approximation that targets the regret of the decision: one decides with the cheaper approximation and is evaluated under the true mass function. On a minimal shortest path, the distance-optimal approximation flips the decision while a decision-aware merge preserves it, and this occurs on a non-negligible fraction of random instances. We prove a one-point bound that localises the regret at the true optimum, turn it into an exact dynamic program for the scalar case, and extend it to an online version that prunes focal elements before the final cost is known. In experiments the decision-aware compressor flips the decision less often than representation-aware compression, for both the linear criterion and a non-linear proxy read-out.