From Observation to Intervention: A Causal Audit of Expert Importance in Mixture-of-Experts Models

Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models route each token to a few of many experts, inviting the hypothesis that experts form functional modules tied to capabilities or languages. We test this causally on Command A+, a frontier open-weights MoE (218B total / 25B active; 128 experts, 8 active, +1 shared). We build a routing-mass atlas, pre-register six family-to-axis hypotheses before any intervention, and ablate each family at inference time against a size-matched random-expert null, measuring whether it selectively breaks its own axis (worst off-target effect at most one third of on-target). Crucially, we test the same families under four metrics and a held-out, independent-corpus run with bootstrap confidence intervals. Our finding is cautionary: robust functional modularity is rare and measurement-dependent. Of six pre-registered families, only one, the Arabic-language family, is a clean selective module that survives an independent corpus and a conservative statistical bar (1/6; a more permissive pre-registered point rule admits 3/6, but that count is threshold-sensitive). Every other family has a real causal effect yet fails selectivity, and its apparent modularity flips with the measurement: with the corpus, the metric, and the statistical bar. A positive control on Qwen3-30B-A3B recovers its published disjoint structure, confirming the method detects modularity when present. The verdict reproduces on the un-quantized BF16 model, ruling out a 4-bit quantization artifact. We conclude that ablation-based modularity verdicts are not safe unless the corpus, metric, and statistical bar are controlled. We release the atlas and ablation data.

Fine-grained mixture-of-experts (MoE) architectures have become a mainstream design for open-weight LLMs, with hundreds of experts and increasingly many selected per token. This shift makes dynamic expert pruning an attractive route to cheaper inference. Yet existing evidence comes largely from coarser architectures and likelihood-scored multiple-choice benchmarks, leaving three central questions open in the fine-grained regime: how redundant per-token expert selection is, how effectively existing pruning methods exploit that redundancy, and what governs a model's sensitivity to pruning. We fill this gap with a systematic empirical study of twelve fine-grained MoE checkpoints spanning nine architecture families, with a core suite of eleven benchmarks covering knowledge QA, mathematics, code generation, and general reasoning. We find that expert selection is far more redundant than the field's operating points assume: uniformly retaining about two thirds of the selected experts preserves 98.8% of unpruned performance on average, requiring only a one-integer change and delivering 1.2-1.7x measured speedup across two serving backends. This simple baseline leaves little room for dynamic allocation at conservative budgets: even the best published rules differ from it by under 1% at matched expert budgets. Their value emerges under aggressive pruning, where the best rules recover up to 3.0% over uniform truncation, with gains concentrated in the generative tasks that suffer the sharpest degradation. Sensitivity to aggressive pruning also depends on the model: larger and thinking models are more resilient, whereas multimodal models are more vulnerable. Together, these findings reveal how much expert computation fine-grained MoEs can dispense with, and establish when dynamic allocation earns its complexity, informing both practical deployment and future pruning methods.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models route each token to a small subset of experts, but whether the routes selected by a trained top-$k$ router are good ones is rarely evaluated directly. Holding the model fixed, we compare each standard route against sampled equal-compute alternatives for the same token and score each by the next-token probability it assigns to the realized token in a verified reasoning trajectory. The result is sharply token-conditional: the standard router is well-aligned with route utility on confident tokens but uninformative on the fragile tokens that drive hard reasoning, where lower-loss equal-compute routes consistently exist inside the frozen model but are not selected. The same pattern holds across Qwen3-30B-A3B, GPT-OSS-20B, DeepSeek-V2-Lite, and OLMoE-1B-7B, and follows structurally from how standard top-$k$ training evaluates routing decisions: the language modeling loss scores only the executed route, and load balancing depends only on aggregate routing statistics. A minimal router-only update to the final-layer router, leaving every expert and every other router frozen, is sufficient to shift pass@K on AIME 2024+2025 and HMMT 2025 for both Qwen3-30B-A3B and GPT-OSS-20B, suggesting that at least part of the failure reflects router-reachable misallocation rather than expert capacity alone.