Can Open-Source LLM Agents Replace Static Application Security Testing Tools? An Empirical Assessment

Advances in large language models (LLMs) fuel the quest for scalable methods to assess the security of generated and security-sensitive software. Static analysis is widely adopted as a scalable, reproducible, and inexpensive security gate, but cannot directly observe runtime exploit behaviour. Vulnerabilities dependent on adversarial inputs, execution context, or exploit chaining may evade static checks while remaining exploitable in practice, yet passing static analysis is often treated as evidence of secure behaviour. This paper introduces the Static-Pass Dynamic-Fail (SPDF) phenomenon and a three-stage agentic pipeline combining static scanning, LLM-driven Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) reasoning, and autonomous exploit verification in isolated Docker containers. We evaluate 1,355 Python samples from SecurityEval, RedCode, and CyberNative datasets. Of the 654 samples producing no findings under the composite Bandit-Semgrep gate, the LLM detection stage identified 394 candidate vulnerabilities across 235 files. Dynamic verification confirmed or partially confirmed exploitability in 95 files, yielding an inclusive pipeline rate of 14.53% (roughly 1 in 7 statically clean samples). This rate represents the proportion of Bandit-Semgrep-clean samples for which the pipeline identified a candidate vulnerability and obtained runtime evidence supporting exploitability. Outcomes varied by dataset: among candidate file--CWE pairs, confirmed exploitability was 33.7% for RedCode, 28.6% for CyberNative, and 5.4% for SecurityEval. Several frequently confirmed classes, including CWE-338 and CWE-916, were flagged by neither Bandit nor Semgrep. These findings indicate that static-analysis success and runtime security are hierarchical layers of software assurance rather than interchangeable measures, and have the potential to reshape how AI-generated and security-sensitive code is evaluated.

The rapid growth of publicly available digital information has rendered manual open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis insufficient for modern intelligence, cybersecurity, and cyber investigation. Large language models (LLMs) and agentic AI systems, capable of tool use, multi-step reasoning, and iterative intelligence generation, have emerged as promising solutions, yet evaluation frameworks have not kept pace with reported capabilities. This survey systematically reviews 74 studies and makes four contributions. First, it establishes agentic AI as a distinct analytical category rather than an extension of LLM prompting, organising the literature through an 11-category taxonomy covering LLM foundations, agentic architectures, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), knowledge graphs, prompt engineering, domain adaptation, evaluation benchmarks, and risk. Second, it identifies the hallucination-validation gap as a corpus-level finding: although hallucination is recognised as a major reliability concern in over twenty studies, end-to-end hallucination is empirically measured in only one OSINT-specific RAG-based system, non-reproducible conditions, while related reasoning and factual-correction studies evaluate general-domain question answering rather than OSINT. Third, it maps existing research to the OSINT lifecycle, showing strong support for collection and analysis but limited coverage of verification, reporting, dissemination, and decision support. Fourth, it derives a ten-point research agenda addressing evaluation, benchmarking, hallucination measurement, adversarial robustness, dark-web coverage, multimodal intelligence, and governance. It concludes that a human-AI co-pilot model, where LLMs assist collection and triage while analysts retain responsibility for verification and decision-making, represents the most defensible near-term deployment architecture.

AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering(RE): recovering program semantics before the analysis can be meaningfully performed. However, evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: benchmark instances must be unseen as source code in the LLMs' training data to prevent models from taking shortcuts by recognizing them rather than really analyzing them, while also matching the scale and anti-analysis protections of real software. Unfortunately, however, existing benchmarks do not jointly satisfy these requirements. To this end, we introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built entirely from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis primitives, yielding 262 binary instances and 1572 deterministically graded tasks. Our evaluation across five frontier LLMs (GPT-5.6-sol,Claude-Opus-5,GPT-5.5,Grok-4.5, and GLM-5.2) shows that RE remains largely unsolved: the strongest model, GPT-5.6-sol, scores 61.4% per instance, and fully solves only 31.5% of the instances. Our analysis further reveals that agents behave differently from human engineers, where agents are relatively insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking. Controlled ablations also confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential. These results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.