End-to-end task-success is the dominant way to evaluate LLM agents, but one aggregate number tells you that an agent regressed, not where. We present layer-isolated evaluation: a deployed ordering agent is decomposed into a fixed taxonomy of layers (ontology, intent, routing, decomposition, escalation, safety, memory, and cross-cutting envelope/defense), each exercised by its own assertion slice in a deterministic, no-LLM "pure" mode. The pure suite (238 cases across 23 slices; 225 run in 2.39 s, ~10 ms/case) runs in CI on every change against a locked per-slice baseline. We validate by controlled regression injection, degrading one layer at a time across seven non-safety layers. The effect we did not design in is masking: the aggregate pass-rate barely moves (-1.7 to -5.9 pp for six local regressions), while the matching slice craters (-25 to -91 pp). A layer's slice reacting to its own fault is partly by construction; the measured results are (i) the aggregate masking and (ii) that damage stays off the other slices: the injected layer's slice is the single worst-hit in 5 of 7 cases and top-3 in 7 of 7 (mean rank 1.29 of 19). Localization replicates on a second, structurally different tenant (Starbucks SG): all seven matching slices crater, so it is not a single-catalog artifact. We position it as a concrete, deterministic instantiation of the component-level evaluation EDDOps prescribes but leaves unimplemented, with CheckList as ancestor and as the deterministic mirror image of whole-workflow stochastic mutation testing. Our contributions: (a) a fully decomposed, sub-second, no-LLM per-layer harness for a production agent, (b) a coverage-honesty test-adequacy criterion that refuses to score an unexercised layer, and (c) the regression-injection demonstration that per-slice baseline-locked gates localize regressions an aggregate metric masks.
LLM-agent evaluations often produce task outcomes long before the full benchmark run is complete. A partial score is tempting to report, but it does not show whether the observed tasks support the same conclusion as the completed evaluation. Early tasks can omit important parts of a benchmark, running cheaper tasks first can distort the observed sample, and a rule that decides only easy pairs can appear accurate while leaving many comparisons unresolved. We introduce ParEvalLayer, a decision layer that reads paired outcomes for two agent systems and a comparison policy chosen in advance. For each partial run, it records whether the tested agent system is better by the required amount, is not better by that amount, needs more evidence, or should abstain. We evaluate ParEvalLayer by replaying completed public benchmark data as if each evaluation had stopped earlier. At each point, ParEvalLayer applies the policy using only the outcomes observed so far; if it reaches one of the two comparison judgments, we check whether that judgment matches the completed data for the same system pair. With the main comparison rule, three of the public benchmarks reach the same decision as the completed evaluation after observing only 15% to 25% of task outcomes. Other benchmarks require more task outcomes. This variation shows why a partial score alone is not enough: reports should also state the decision rule and how many comparisons remain without a decision.
Tool-using LLM agents are mostly evaluated assuming all tools work. When a tool times out, returns a week-stale value, or has its description poisoned in deployment, the developer needs a controlled way to reproduce the failure, test a fix, and confirm the fix worked before deployment. We present AgentCheck, an open-source web workbench that turns an MCP server into an intervention surface. AgentCheck runs an agent against its real tools and records every tool response, then re-runs the agent with the response perturbed by a fault (12 types) injector. Matching tool calls are replayed from cache, and later tool calls go live after the agent diverges. This yields a reproduce-intervene-confirm loop: the developer toggles a mitigation, re-runs against the identical fault, and sees if the failure goes away. Scoring has two parts: deterministic pass/fail rules, plus an LLM judge for interpretive labels, validated against human annotations. Across five agents, the best passes 105/120 scenarios and the weakest only 77. The failures are usually silent, confident use of incorrect tool outputs rather than crashes. On the weakest agent, a retry mitigation raises success on timeout error faults from as few as 30% of cases to 100%, whereas stale-data faults remain near 3-4 of 10 regardless of the mitigation. AgentCheck makes these failure modes reproducible, comparable, and verifiable before deployment.
Multi-agent LLM pipelines increasingly span organisational boundaries; when a fault surfaces, someone must determine where it entered. The artifact available is rarely a full execution trace: it is the reports each agent filed, and a filed report can state a conclusion alongside its observations. Using a pre-registered, institutionally partitioned pipeline of six agents with process-level information boundaries, balanced defect injection and matched clean twins (345,600 requests per chain model, two models), we first report that our pre-registered hypothesis -- that collective responsibility framing degrades escalation with chain length -- is not supported. The layer nevertheless fails asymmetrically. It originates almost nothing: zero allegations across 7,996 clean episodes where every agent stayed silent. It filters upstream error poorly, naming an innocent party in 34.4% and 62.6% of clean episodes where an agent raised a false alarm. Conditional on no agent proposing the true origin (59.5% of episodes on one chain model), an auditor reading the reports recovers it in 4.1% of cases -- below a uniform guess (20%) and the best fixed-link accuser (31.0%) -- while reaching 60.3% from the raw documentation of the same episodes. Deleting one clause, the field carrying the agents' own conclusion, isolates the cause at constant observations: accuracy rises to 45.2% (+41.2 pp, 95% CI +35.3 to +46.9) and adherence collapses from 94.4% to 3.4%; where the suggestion was correct the same deletion instead costs accuracy, 70.5% to 55.7%. The harm replicates on two frontier auditors in four conditions out of four (+8.5 to +39.0 pp) and in a second domain (+47.7 and +61.1 pp), where the cost disappears. The net effect is governed by upstream reliability together with both conditional magnitudes. An accountability layer needs evidence sufficiently independent of the conclusions it verifies.