Two Wrongs, No Right: Auditing Social-Desirability Bias in LLM Annotators for Computational Social Science

Computational social science increasingly relies on large language models for text annotation, and the validity of published findings now rests on the labels generated by such models. Decision models, a new model class built for categorical question answering, answer typed questions with a choice, a probability distribution over the label set, and a confidence score rather than free text, at a small fraction of frontier inference prices. Whether their answers are accurate, and whether that stated confidence can be trusted on social science constructs, are unknown. Here, we mirror the evaluation of Ziems et al. (2024) on 18 computational social science classification tasks (7,977 items), comparing the first commercial decision model and two open-weight counterparts against 19 frontier and open-weight language models under the same zero-shot protocol, and extending the decision-model comparison to eleven open-weight systems released in the week after it. The decision model trails the per-task best LLM on 14 of 15 evaluation tasks, with a median deficit of 11.6 macro-F1 points, at a median 44 times lower measured cost. Its confidence is better calibrated than the verbalized confidence of 16 of the 19 LLMs, yet three frontier models show lower median calibration error (0.157 against 0.066). While items above 0.9 confidence are typically labeled accurately (median accuracy 0.815), on one task, empathy in peer-support dialogues, the model reports high confidence while performing near chance. Nonetheless, our results suggest that decision models are useful as a first step in the annotation pipeline: routing low-confidence items to an LLM matches or exceeds the LLM alone at a quarter to half of its cost.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, accurately evaluating their latent values and biases is critical. The NLP community typically evaluates models using large, unstructured benchmarks. While effective for general capabilities, these datasets fundamentally conflate causal mechanisms: even when an aggregate bias is detected, unstructured evaluations cannot disentangle whether it stems from baseline traits, contextual confounders, or complex interactions. To address this, we introduce an analytically exact framework for the controlled behavioral evaluation of LLMs. We bridge human psychometrics with LLM mechanics by resolving gaps in design, measurement, and analysis. First, we replace unstructured prompting with fully crossed factorial experiments to systematically isolate causal main and interaction effects. Second, we eliminate Monte Carlo text sampling noise by operating directly on exact, token-level Probability Mass Functions (PMFs). Third, we derive a multivariate ordinal consensus metric and a distributional ANOVA to process these PMFs analytically. We validate our framework with a case study on consumer ethnocentrism across five LLMs, demonstrating how our approach isolates systemic country-of-origin biases that aggregate benchmarks otherwise obscure.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges for subjective tasks, where annotators disagree and the relevant question is not only how accurate a judge is, but whose judgments it reproduces. Sociodemographic prompting conditions the judge on an annotator's demographic profile to align its judgments with the corresponding group's. We test whether this alignment emerges distributionally, comparing the predicted label distributions of 23 open-weight LLMs on three subjective tasks against those of real annotator groups, under three conditions: no demographic information, single-attribute profiles, and intersectional profiles over gender, age, race, and education. Three findings emerge. First, a judge prompted with no demographics is not perspective-neutral: models best reproduce the judgments of White, college-educated annotators. Second, demographic conditioning is asymmetric: it moves the judge toward majority groups and away from minority groups, most strongly on offensiveness, where intersectional profiles amplify the harm. Third, by comparing base and instruct models we identify instruction-tuning as a possible source of the asymmetry. Demographic conditioning should therefore be used with caution to estimate group judgments: conditioning moves predictions away from the reference distributions of the minority groups the method is often invoked to serve.