Understanding helpfulness and harmless tension in reward models

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.