A Three-Layer Framework for AI in Scientific Discovery

Scientific discovery is an inherently creative and uncertain process, requiring reasoning beyond the recall of known knowledge. While many benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate large language model (LLM) performance on deep research tasks via multi-hop retrieval, their innovative reasoning abilities essential for true scientific discovery remain largely untested. We introduce a benchmark framework for evaluating model performance in scientific discovery and reasoning, building up from a raw problem to the classical null hypothesis test. In our framework, models initially receive only the topic and research question from a recent paper, with technical details progressively revealed. At each stage of information disclosure, the model is tasked with generating hypotheses that address the research question, which is compared with the conclusions from the original paper and evaluated via automated semantic similarity of constituent atomic claims. This progressive evaluation of semantic divergence from ground-truth conclusions enables assessment of a model's innovativeness (under minimal information) to grounded reasoning capabilities (under full experimental details), both critical for using LLMs for scientific discovery purposes. Our framework provides a foundation for systematically evaluating scientific reasoning and discovery capabilities in LLMs, crucial for advancing the development of next-generation AI scientist/co-scientist systems. Specifically, here we evaluate GPT-5, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 pro, and Gemini 3.1 pro preview across 45 papers spanning bioactive materials, mechanical materials, and nanomaterials. We find that GPT-5.4 and Gemini 3.1 pro outperform their previous generation counterparts as expected, and GPT-5.4 in particular maintains 0.7 F1 score alignment with ground truth conclusions even under minimal context.

Modern artificial intelligence excels at prediction but cannot explain. From large language models to AI-for-science systems, today's machines answer what by recombining patterns already present in the human literature, yet they cannot reason out why a phenomenon must arise from underlying principles even though explanation, not prediction, lies at the heart of scientific discovery. Here we ask whether the structure of scientific explanation can be operationalized to guide how a machine generates hypotheses. We introduce DN-Hypo-Pipeline, a hypothesis-generation framework that adopts a layered, explanation-theoretic scaffold: Hempel's deductive-nomological (DN) model supplies the output form and deductive validity of a hypothesis, Salmon's causal-process account supplies an organizing constraint on where to search for the governing laws, and Armstrong's view of laws as relations between universals supplies the bridge from a phenomenon's constituent processes to the laws that may be associated with it. Rather than searching the space of what has been written, the framework searches the space of what principles govern a phenomenon: given an explanandum, it abstracts the universals instantiated in the phenomenon's formation process, retrieves the laws relating those universals, and deductively reconstructs a new, testable explanation. Evaluated in data-science modeling and judged by both LLMs and human experts, hypotheses generated through this principled reasoning significantly outperform those from direct prompting. Crucially, we translated the two highest-scoring hypotheses into novel algorithms one that reduces the Transformer's theoretical complexity with only minimal performance loss, and another that achieves competitive accuracy with substantially fewer parameters.

Recent advances in foundation models have transformed AI for Science, enabling remarkably accurate predictive performance across domains ranging from protein folding to weather forecasting. Yet prediction alone does not constitute scientific discovery. Scientific understanding depends on uncovering the reusable explanatory mechanisms that generate observations, whereas contemporary machine learning remains fundamentally organised around predictive mappings rather than explanatory structure. In this paper, we argue that scientific discovery is fundamentally a problem of knowledge organisation. To this end, we introduce Mechanistic World Models, a new design paradigm that places reusable mechanisms at the centre of representation, computation and learning. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of science, we derive the computational capabilities required for discovery, identify the design principles and inductive pressures that encourage explanatory knowledge to emerge, and formalise the anatomy of a mechanism-centric world model. Finally, we show how diverse research directions including mechanistic interpretability, causal representation learning, equation discovery and modular architectures capture complementary ingredients of this paradigm while lacking a unified framework. We propose Mechanistic World Models as a conceptual foundation and computational blueprint for moving AI beyond predictive forecasting towards autonomous scientific discovery.