Side-Channel Attacks Bypass Protection in 3D Printers

Voiceprints are widely used for authentication; however, they are easily captured in public settings and cannot be revoked once leaked. Existing anonymization systems operate inside recording devices, which makes them ineffective when microphones or software are untrusted, as in conference rooms, lecture halls, and interviews. We present EchoMask, the first practical physical-layer system for real-time voiceprint anonymization using acoustic metamaterials. By modifying sound waves before they reach the microphone, EchoMask prevents attackers from capturing clean voiceprints through compromised devices. Our design combines three key innovations: frequency-selective interference to disrupt voiceprint features while preserving speech intelligibility, an acoustic-field model to ensure stability under speaker movement, and reconfigurable structures that create time-varying interference to prevent learning or canceling a fixed acoustic pattern. EchoMask is low-cost, power-free, and 3D-printable, requiring no machine learning, software support, or microphone modification. Experiments conducted across eight microphones in diverse environments demonstrate that EchoMask increases the Miss-match Rate, i.e., the fraction of failed voiceprint matching attempts, to over 90%, while maintaining high speech intelligibility.

Additive manufacturing (AM) continues to transform modern manufacturing by enabling flexible, on-demand production of complex geometries across diverse industries. Fused filament fabrication (FFF) has extended AM to laboratories, classrooms, and small production environments, but this accessibility shifts process-planning responsibility to users who may lack manufacturing expertise. A syntactically valid slicer profile can still encode thermally or geometrically harmful settings, and subtle G-code edits can alter extrusion, cooling, or adhesion before a print begins. Pre-print G-code screening catches accidental or adversarial machine-program errors before material or machine time is wasted. This paper proposes LLM-ADAM as a generalizable LLM framework for pre-print anomaly detection in AM. The framework decomposes the task into three roles: Extractor-LLM maps a G-code file to a structured process-parameter schema; Reference-LLM converts printer and material documentation into aligned operating ranges; and Judge-LLM interprets a deterministic deviation table and G-code evidence to decide whether a part is non-defective or belongs to an anomaly class. Printers, materials, and LLM backbones are interchangeable test conditions, not fixed assumptions. We evaluate the framework on an N=200 FFF G-code corpus spanning two desktop printer families, two materials, and five classes including non-defective, under-extrusion, over-extrusion, warping, and stringing. The best framework configuration reaches 87.5% accuracy, compared with 59.5% for the strongest engineered single-LLM baseline. The results show that structured decomposition, rather than backbone strength alone, is the dominant source of improvement, with defect classes identified at or near ceiling for leading configurations while residual errors concentrate on conservative false alarms for non-defective samples.

Deep learning-based side-channel analysis has historically focused on single-byte targets and manually cropped traces, which risks discarding exploitable leakage. While recent work has proposed specialized architectures and resampling techniques to address this gap, the literature lacks a simple transformer baseline for simultaneous full-key attacks on uncropped traces. We present an open-source transformer implementation for uncropped full-key attacks which uses the standard transformer encoder backbone, adapting only the input and output layers to the side-channel setting. We release our implementation, training recipes, and pretrained weights for uncropped ASCADv1f, ASCADv1r, and CHES-CTF-2018 which achieve performance competitive with previously-reported results, while using less than 10GB of VRAM and requiring at most 3.34 hours of training on a single NVIDIA A6000.