Cooperative multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL) models team decision making under multiple, potentially conflicting objectives. In this setting, conflicts arise not only across objectives but also across agents with different observations, roles, and contributions. We propose Preference Coordinated Multi-agent Policy Optimization (PCMA), which learns coordinated agent-specific preferences to enable complementary trade-offs among agents. Theoretically, we formulate cooperative MOMARL as a team-optimal game and show that, under suitable conditions, preference diversity can induce team improvement through a first-order improvement decomposition. Experiments on multiple cooperative MOMA environments and a practical traffic-control scenario show that PCMA improves both performance and trade-off coordination.
Constrained Multi-agent reinforcement learning (CMARL) faces two intertwined challenges: the joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, and additional requirements couple agents in ways that reward structure alone does not capture. We introduce Coordination Graphs for Constrained Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (CG-CMARL), a framework that addresses both challenges by combining coordination graphs with Lagrangian duality. The system decomposes the joint problem into pairwise regions, each served by a set of shared Q-functions, one for the primary objective and one for each of the constraints, so that the number of learned models is independent of the number of agents. At execution time, Max-Sum message passing coordinates actions across the factor graph, while a Lagrangian multiplier controls the objective--constraint tradeoff, allowing a single trained model to trace a Pareto front without retraining. We provide convergence guarantees under mild conditions, together with a compositional error bound that decomposes into separate interpretable sources, each traceable to a specific design choice and independently controllable. Experiments on cooperative navigation tasks (where teams of up to 10 agents must coordinate to reach target positions while satisfying pairwise constraints) show that our method produces Pareto fronts dominating established baselines trained at fixed reward-shaping ratios, while scaling to team sizes where centralized approaches become intractable.
Santiago Amaya-Corredor, Miguel Calvo-Fullana, Anders Jonsson
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful framework for solving complex collaborative tasks, but it relies heavily on well-defined global reward functions. Designing such rewards is challenging, especially in systems with heterogeneous agents, where a single scalar objective may fail to capture diverse behaviors. In this paper, we introduce Multi-AGent Preference-Integrated lEarning (MAGPIE), which addresses these challenges through agent-specific preference modeling. Each agent is evaluated by a dedicated expert through preference signals, eliminating the need for global evaluation. We theoretically prove that optimizing these decentralized preferences converges to a Nash equilibrium policy. To integrate local preferences into a coherent global objective, we construct agent-specific reward models from preference data and combine them via a monotonic aggregation mechanism. We further prove that optimizing this aggregate reward model is equivalent to training the Nash equilibrium policy. Extensive experiments on benchmark multi-agent tasks and a sequential production line task show that MAGPIE achieves performance comparable to reward-engineered baselines, demonstrating its potential to facilitate policy learning in scenarios where precise reward engineering is impractical.
Reinforcement Learning (RL) systems are typically trained using a single, well-specified scalar reward function. However, real-world decision-making tasks often involve multiple, competing objectives, such as performance versus efficiency, where ground-truth reward functions are difficult to specify or inaccessible. While Multi-Objective RL (MORL) addresses such trade-offs by modeling rewards as vectors, existing approaches typically assume access to a well-specified reward function for each objective, inheriting the same challenges faced by single-objective RL. Meanwhile, Preference-based RL (PbRL) has shown great potential in solving complex tasks without access to a pre-defined reward function through reward learning from human feedback, yet has largely been studied in single-objective settings. In this work, we bridge this gap with LEMUR: Learning to Align with Multi-Objective Reinforcement Learning with Preference feedback, a novel framework where an agent interactively learns from the preferences of multiple humans to learn optimal multi-objective policies. Our approach jointly learns policies and multiple objective-specific reward models from human feedback, enabling agents to effectively balance competing objectives during learning. We evaluate LEMUR on a variety of benchmark multi-objective tasks, and empirical results demonstrate its superior performance over baseline methods. Our method presents a promising direction for solving multi-objective decision-making tasks without pre-defined reward functions.