Self-Driving Negotiator: An interactive, verifiable benchmark for social negotiation and theory of mind under hidden intent

In high-conflict mixed-traffic scenarios involving human-driven and autonomous vehicles, most existing autonomous driving systems default to overly conservative behaviors, lack proactive interaction, and consequently suffer from limited public acceptance. To mitigate intent misunderstandings and decision failures, we present a Large Language Model based interactive decision-making framework that augments scene understanding and intent-aware interaction to jointly improve safety and efficiency. The approach uses Object-Process Methodology to semantically model complex multi-vehicle scenes, abstracting low-level perceptual data into objects, processes, and relations, thereby streamlining reasoning over latent causal structure. Building on this representation, the Large Language Model parses both explicit and implicit intents of surrounding agents and, under jointly enforced safety and efficiency constraints, selects candidate maneuvers. We further generate perturbed trajectory candidates via Monte Carlo sampling and evaluate them to obtain an optimized executable trajectory. To foster transparency and coordination with nearby road users, the final decision is translated by the Large Language Model into concise natural-language messages and broadcast through an external Human-Machine Interface, completing a closed loop from scene understanding to action to language. Experiments in a cluster driving simulator demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms traditional baselines across safety, comfort, and efficiency metrics, while a Turing-test-style evaluation indicates a high degree of human-likeness in decision making. Besides, these results suggest that coupling semantic scene abstraction with Large Language Model mediated intent reasoning and language-based eHMI communication offers a practical pathway toward interactive, trustworthy autonomous driving in dense mixed traffic.

Mixed autonomy driving becomes unsafe and inefficient when autonomous vehicles (AVs) and human-driven vehicles (HVs) misread each other's intentions. We study this problem as implicit mutual communication in lane changes. The proposed framework models how the ego vehicle both expresses its intent and probes the other driver's preference under epistemic uncertainty. It combines a level-k Bayesian persuasion game with virtual features for proactive signaling, information-theoretic rewards for mutual communication, and adaptive weights of communication affordances. We further introduce the Pride-Inquiry (P-I) and Pride-Prejudice (P-P) planes to analyze communication intensity and tendency. The model is calibrated with a Communication-Based Multi-Agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning algorithm (C-MIRL) on the naturalistic NGSIM dataset. Compared with the non-communicative baseline, the proposed model reduces the prediction error of mandatory lane changes by up to 20% while maintaining strong generalization. Driver-In-the-Loop questionnaire scores are positively correlated with the calibrated communication variables, supporting the subjective validity of the model. The learned rewards further show that inquiry and listening affordances contribute more than pride and expression alone, and that inquiry preference varies more strongly across drivers. These results support explicit modeling of mutual communication and epistemic uncertainty in interactive driving.

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.