Multimodal models can name the action units (AUs) behind a facial emotion, but their AU->emotion rationales are typically plausible rather than faithful: nothing forces the AUs a model invokes to be the AUs that actually drive its prediction. We cast AU->emotion reasoning as a counterfactual-consistency problem between the rationale, the label, and a structural AU->emotion causal graph G, and propose FACR, which grounds the reasoner in an independently induced, polarity-aware G and trains a counterfactual-faithfulness objective: a do-intervention on an AU that G marks causal for a class must move the prediction, while one it marks irrelevant must leave it unchanged. Faithfulness is thereby both trainable and measurable through a matching interventional metric, which we evaluate against a known causal structure, the PSPI pain-AU composition, as no existing affective-reasoning benchmark allows. We are explicit that this metric tests fidelity to the supplied structure rather than its rediscovery: it asks whether the trained reasoner invokes the AUs the structure marks causal, on held-out subjects and a second dataset. Under subject-independent evaluation on UNBC-PAIN, the objective raises the agreement between the invoked AUs and the PSPI composition from a no-objective baseline of 0.08 to 0.57, at a small detection cost; an unfaithfulness control attributes the gain to the objective. On a cross-dataset emotion transfer, the objective likewise raises fidelity to G on a seven-class task (0.50 to 0.84). Finally, we attach a language verbalizer and extend the audit to the generated text: biasing each action unit's emission by its latent activation makes the rationale faithful by construction, so that ablating an AU removes it from the explanation, a property that transfers to a second language-model backbone, whereas a freely generated rationale is unfaithful.
Explanations for emotion classifiers are usually produced post hoc, with no guarantee that they reflect the computation behind the label. We present an explication interface for event-based emotion analysis. A parser maps the input text to an explication, a short script in the closed vocabulary of Natural Semantic Metalanguage organized into twelve typed slots, and a fixed decision list of rules transcribed from published semantic definitions computes the label from the explication alone. The faithfulness guarantee is therefore causal and definitional, while all empirical risk lives in the learned parser, which the per-line entailment interface makes auditable against the input. On crowd-sourced event descriptions, our fine-tuned parser reaches 0.33 accuracy and 0.48 selective accuracy on a small held-out set, suggesting that the interface trades insignificant accuracy difference to a black-box model for a verifiable, inspectable decision basis for first-person event-based emotion analysis. We also release EmoExpl-1200 with per-line verification metadata and the full rule set.
Large language models can easily generate explanations for their own outputs, but such self-explanations are not necessarily faithful to the model's behavior. We study this issue through counterfactual self-explanations, where a model minimally edits an input so that its own prediction changes. Across sentiment analysis and natural language inference, we evaluate ten instruction-tuned models from the LLaMA-3 and Qwen-2.5 families, measuring faithfulness, minimality, and alignment with human-annotated rationales. Our results show that model scale is the strongest determinant of explanation quality: larger models are substantially more likely to generate counterfactuals that flip their own predictions and target decision-relevant evidence. In contrast, the rationale-guided condition produces edit-minimal counterfactuals that are also more human-aligned. However, it does not consistently improve faithfulness. Overall, counterfactual self-explanations can provide useful behavioral evidence about model decisions, but their reliability depends strongly on model capacity and should be empirically validated rather than assumed.
Latent reasoning performs multi-step inference in continuous hidden states, promising more compact and efficient reasoning. However, these opaque states raise a question of faithfulness: whether the latent reasoning steps drive the final answer. Prior work studies this question at selected checkpoints and reports several unfaithful behaviors. This endpoint view leaves how evidence of faithfulness evolves during training unexamined. We track behavioral and activation-based evidence across training using verified counterfactual edits and interventions on the latent reasoning states. We find that high task accuracy can coexist with low counterfactual responsiveness: as accuracy improves, responsiveness can decline, and different latent reasoning approaches follow distinct trajectories. On ProsQA, output sensitivity to norm-noise replacement declines alongside counterfactual responsiveness, although the result depends on the replacement. Across separately trained binary-choice and open-ended GSM settings, intervention sensitivity follows opposite trajectories. These results show that evaluating only a final checkpoint can obscure both when counterfactual responsiveness changes and what the latent states contribute.