Simulating Hate Speech Cascades with Multi-LLM Agents: Empirical Grounding, Modeling Fidelity, and Intervention Strategies

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are powering a growing share of interactive web applications, yet remain vulnerable to misuse and harm. Prior jailbreak research has largely focused on single-turn prompts, whereas real harassment often unfolds over multi-turn interactions. In this work, we present the Online Harassment Agentic Benchmark consisting of: (i) a synthetic multi-turn harassment conversation dataset, (ii) a multi-agent (e.g., harasser, victim) simulation informed by repeated game theory, (iii) three jailbreak methods attacking agents across memory, planning, and fine-tuning, and (iv) a mixed-methods evaluation framework. We utilize two prominent LLMs, LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct (open-source) and Gemini-2.0-flash (closed-source). Our results show that jailbreak tuning makes harassment nearly guaranteed with an attack success rate of 95.78--96.89% vs. 57.25--64.19% without tuning in Llama, and 99.33% vs. 98.46% without tuning in Gemini, while sharply reducing refusal rate to 1-2% in both models. The most prevalent toxic behaviors are Insult with 84.9--87.8% vs. 44.2--50.8% without tuning, and Flaming with 81.2--85.1% vs. 31.5--38.8% without tuning, indicating weaker guardrails compared to sensitive categories such as sexual or racial harassment. Qualitative evaluation further reveals that attacked agents reproduce human-like aggression profiles, such as Machiavellian/psychopathic patterns under planning, and narcissistic tendencies with memory. Counterintuitively, closed-source and open-source models exhibit distinct escalation trajectories across turns, with closed-source models showing significant vulnerability. Overall, our findings show that multi-turn and theory-grounded attacks not only succeed at high rates but also mimic human-like harassment dynamics, motivating the development of robust safety guardrails to ultimately keep online platforms safe and responsible.

LLM-powered social agents are increasingly used to simulate online social behavior, yet their realism remains difficult to validate. Existing work has largely relied on general-purpose benchmarks, while less attention has been paid to short, reactive discourse such as audience replies to online news. In this paper, we evaluate whether LLM-generated reactions to Spanish online news reproduce measurable properties of real audience discourse. Using the Hatemedia dataset, we pair 5,631 news items with 58,555 real audience reactions, and generate a matched synthetic dataset using five LLMs under a shared experimental setting. We compare real and synthetic reactions across three dimensions: hate speech, sentiment, and semantic alignment, considering both off-the-shelf and fine-tuned generation. Results show that off-the-shelf models are poor proxies for real audience reactions: they strongly underproduce hate speech, introduce model-specific sentiment biases, and remain distributionally distant from human replies. Fine-tuning improves fidelity unevenly. Qwen3 provides the most balanced approximation, while Mistral7B achieves the strongest sentiment and semantic alignment but overshoots hate prevalence. Plausible synthetic replies do not necessarily reproduce the distributional properties of public discourse.

When large language models serve as evaluators in multi-agent systems, their strategy preferences -- whether induced by explicit prompts or by shared architectural priors -- propagate through the agent network. We introduce Contagion Networks, a formal framework for measuring how evaluator preferences spread across interacting LLM agents. In a controlled 3-agent experiment using DeepSeek-chat with three distinct evaluator preference profiles (structured, balanced, evidence-based), we measure the Cross-Agent Contagion Matrix Gamma_3 and find that preferences consistently propagate between agents (gamma in [0.157, 0.352]). A neutral-prompt control experiment reveals a counter-intuitive result: shared architectural priors dominate explicit preference prompts as the driver of contagion (rho_neutral = 1.498 vs. rho_mixed = 1.299; prompt contribution: -63.5%). We identify three propagation regimes governed by the spectral radius rho(Gamma_N) and demonstrate that the same agents suppress preference contagion in chain topology (beta_3 = 0.0126 +/- 0.0038, 95% CI [0.0089, 0.0163], n=4 seeds) but cascade in fully-connected topology (Delta H_avg = -0.020) -- a topology-dependent regime transition validated both for homogeneous and cross-model agent pools (rho^cross = 1.296 +/- 0.016, n=4). We show that increasing evaluator committee size from k=1 to k=3 reduces effective contagion by 68.9% +/- 14.1% (n=4 seeds), providing an actionable mitigation strategy. We release the open-source Contagion Network experimental framework.