Large language models (LLMs) increasingly review and revise text, including their own. A documented self-preference bias (models favoring their own generations when acting as judges) raises the question of whether models also resist valid corrections to their own writing. We test this in a setting where "valid" is decided not by another model but by a deterministic verifier: instruction-following revision on IFEval. A model writes a draft; the official IFEval checker confirms the draft violates a constraint and that a candidate edit fixes it; the model then accepts or rejects that edit either as the genuine in-context author or as a fresh model that sees the draft neutrally. Across four mid-tier model families and 85 author-versus-fresh comparisons, we find no detectable self-preference: authors reject verified-good fixes to their own drafts at essentially the same rate as fresh models judging the same drafts (gap -5.1 pp, 95% CI [-12.9, +2.7]). A self-skepticism hint from a smaller pilot did not replicate at scale. The one robust observation is qualitative: when authors do reject a verified-good fix, 97% of their stated reasons are flaw-catching rather than preference, that is, about the character of rejections, not an elevated rate. Effects smaller than ~13 pp cannot be excluded at this sample size.
Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) favor their own outputs when acting as judges, undermining the integrity of automated post-training and evaluation workflows. However, it is difficult to disentangle which behaviors are explained by narcissism versus experimental confounds. Specifically, LLM evaluators may deliver self-preferring verdicts when comparing responses to questions they fail on; these verdicts may not depend on the identity of the author, but on evaluator quality. We correct this by directly comparing the judge's voting distribution in cases where it evaluates itself versus another model. This evaluator quality baseline reveals that only 51% of examples in previous findings retain statistical significance against this null hypothesis, covering 89.6% of total self-preference probability mass. Finally, we compare the entropy of voting distributions, suggesting uncertainty-driven overlap, and show that our procedure enables more careful documentation against the backdrop of judge-bias research.
Dani Roytburg, Matthew Bozoukov, Matthew Nguyen +3
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as automated evaluators, yet they suffer from "self-preference bias": a tendency to favor their own outputs over those of other models. This bias undermines fairness and reliability in evaluation pipelines, particularly for tasks like preference tuning and model routing. We investigate whether lightweight steering vectors can mitigate this problem at inference time without retraining. We introduce a curated dataset that distinguishes self-preference bias into justified examples of self-preference and unjustified examples of self-preference, and we construct steering vectors using two methods: Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA) and an optimization-based approach. Our results show that steering vectors can reduce unjustified self-preference bias by up to 97%, substantially outperforming prompting and direct preference optimization baselines. Yet steering vectors are unstable on legitimate self-preference and unbiased agreement, implying self-preference spans multiple or nonlinear directions. This underscores both their promise and limits as safeguards for LLM-as-judges and motivates more robust interventions.
Dani Roytburg, Matthew Bozoukov, Matthew Nguyen +3
Large language models are increasingly used in multi-agent systems, where they see and respond to other agents' answers. A key risk is conformity: a model may abandon its own answer simply because others agree on a different one. Prior studies show that LLMs often revise toward a majority answer, but it remains unclear whether these revisions help correct mistakes as often as they introduce new errors. In this paper, we conduct a controlled study in which an LLM first answers a question, then sees simulated peer responses before making a final decision. We manipulate two social cues: consensus structure and authority labels assigned to peers, and measure how they influence beneficial and harmful revisions. Across four open-weight LLMs and seven QA datasets, we find that peer agreement makes it much easier to mislead initially correct models than to correct initially wrong ones. Authority labels make models more likely to choose the endorsed answer, regardless of whether it is correct. More concerningly, generic reasoning interventions such as chain-of-thought and reflection do not reliably reduce harmful revision while preserving beneficial revision. These findings suggest that multi-agent LLM systems should verify peer answers rather than simply aggregate them.