Human Decision-Making with AI Assistance under Correlated Features

It is widely agreed that when AI models assist decision-makers in high-stakes domains by predicting an outcome of interest, they should communicate the confidence of their predictions. However, empirical evidence suggests that decision-makers often struggle to determine when to trust a prediction based solely on this communicated confidence. In this context, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests a positive correlation between the utility of AI-assisted decision-making and the degree of alignment between the AI confidence and the decision-makers' confidence in their own predictions. Crucially, these findings do not yet elucidate the extent to which this alignment influences the complexity of learning to make optimal decisions through repeated interactions. In this paper, we address this question in the canonical case of binary predictions and binary decisions. We first show that this problem is equivalent to a two-armed online contextual learning problem with full feedback, and establish a lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{|H| \cdot |B| \cdot T} )$ on the expected regret any learner can attain, where $H$ and $B$ denote the sets of human and AI confidence values. We then demonstrate that, under perfect alignment between AI and human confidence, a learner can attain an expected regret of $O(\sqrt{|H| \cdot T\log T})$ and, when $\sqrt{|H|} = O(\log T)$ and $B$ is countable, a non-trivial generalization of the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality improves the regret bound to $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$. Taken together, these results reveal that alignment can reduce the complexity of learning to make decisions with AI assistance. Experiments on real data from two different human-subject studies where participants solve simple decision-making tasks assisted by AI models show that our theoretical results are robust to violations of perfect alignment.

Human decision-makers often face choices about complex cases with many potentially relevant features, but limited bandwidth to inspect and integrate all available information. In such settings, we study algorithms that highlight a small subset of case-specific features for human consideration, rather than producing a single prediction or recommendation. We model highlighting as a constrained information policy that selects a small number of features to reveal. A central issue is how humans interpret the algorithm's choice of features: a sophisticated agent correctly conditions on the selection rule, while a naive agent updates only on revealed feature values and treats the selection event as exogenous. We show that optimizing highlighting for sophisticated agents can be computationally intractable, even in simple discrete and binary settings, whereas optimizing for naive agents is tractable as long as the maximal bandwidth is fixed. We also show that a highlighting policy that is optimal for sophisticated agents can perform arbitrarily poorly when deployed to naive agents, motivating robust, implementable alternatives. We illustrate our framework in a calibrated empirical exercise based on the American Housing Survey. Overall, our results establish the value of highlighting a context-specific set of features rather than a fixed one as a practically appealing and computationally feasible tool for achieving human-algorithm complementarity.

Machine learning models are often intended to augment rather than replace human decision makers, by providing information that is complementary to human judgement. Yet, in practice, human decision makers routinely fail to realize such complementary gains, even when models provide useful signal. In this work, we study how asymmetric information about the quality of information available to a human decision maker vs. an AI impacts the ability of a decision maker to extract complementary value from AI predictions. We show that a key factor is the error correlation structure between human and AI predictions. In particular, when the AI's prediction errors are \textit{negatively correlated} with those of the human, the decision maker can construct robust strategies which guarantee improvements in expected utility. We empirically investigate whether these conditions for complementarity arise in practice, using real-world forecasting benchmarks.