Memory Contagion: Cross-Temporal Propagation of Evaluator Bias via Agent Memory

When large language models serve as evaluators in multi-agent systems, their strategy preferences -- whether induced by explicit prompts or by shared architectural priors -- propagate through the agent network. We introduce Contagion Networks, a formal framework for measuring how evaluator preferences spread across interacting LLM agents. In a controlled 3-agent experiment using DeepSeek-chat with three distinct evaluator preference profiles (structured, balanced, evidence-based), we measure the Cross-Agent Contagion Matrix Gamma_3 and find that preferences consistently propagate between agents (gamma in [0.157, 0.352]). A neutral-prompt control experiment reveals a counter-intuitive result: shared architectural priors dominate explicit preference prompts as the driver of contagion (rho_neutral = 1.498 vs. rho_mixed = 1.299; prompt contribution: -63.5%). We identify three propagation regimes governed by the spectral radius rho(Gamma_N) and demonstrate that the same agents suppress preference contagion in chain topology (beta_3 = 0.0126 +/- 0.0038, 95% CI [0.0089, 0.0163], n=4 seeds) but cascade in fully-connected topology (Delta H_avg = -0.020) -- a topology-dependent regime transition validated both for homogeneous and cross-model agent pools (rho^cross = 1.296 +/- 0.016, n=4). We show that increasing evaluator committee size from k=1 to k=3 reduces effective contagion by 68.9% +/- 14.1% (n=4 seeds), providing an actionable mitigation strategy. We release the open-source Contagion Network experimental framework.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to $+3.6$ points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

Safety evaluations of memory-equipped LLM agents typically measure within-task safety: whether an agent completes a single scenario safely, often under adversarial conditions such as prompt injection or memory poisoning. In deployment, however, a single agent serves many independent tasks over a long horizon, and memory accumulated during earlier tasks can affect behavior on later, unrelated ones. Studying this regime requires evaluation along the temporal dimension across tasks: not whether an agent is safe at any single memory state, but how its safety profile changes as memory accumulates across many independent interactions. We call this failure mode temporal memory contamination. To isolate memory exposure from stream non-stationarity, we introduce a trigger-probe protocol that evaluates a fixed probe set against read-only memory snapshots at varying prefix lengths, together with a NullMemory counterfactual baseline for identifying memory-induced violations. We apply this protocol across three deployment scenarios spanning records, memos, forms, and email correspondence and eight memory architectures, and additionally on Claw-like AI agents, such as OpenClaw, using the platform's native memory mechanism. Memory-enabled agents consistently exceed the NullMemory baseline, and memory-induced violation rates show a robust upward trend with exposure length on both agent classes. Order-randomization experiments indicate that the effect is driven primarily by accumulated content rather than encounter order. Finally, a structural consequence of the event decomposition is that memory-induced risk is detectable from retrieval state before generation, which we confirm with a high-recall diagnostic monitor. Our results argue for treating memory safety as a longitudinal property that requires temporal evaluation, not a single-state property that can be captured by a snapshot.