PROTECT-90: A Fault Dataset for Power System Protection

Data-driven pre-fault dynamic security assessment (DSA) rapidly evaluates the dynamic risk of credible contingencies on a power system using machine learning. Existing approaches face two limitations. First, they require a large labelled database for training, with a separate model trained, tuned, and maintained for each contingency in a potentially long list of credible contingencies. Second, the trained models generalize poorly to unseen contingencies. This work addresses the limitations by using a tabular foundation model (TFM) that assesses stability through in-context learning, requiring no retraining or hyperparameter optimization. A single TFM can assess many contingencies at once, removing the need for one model per classifier. We also characterize when the use of electrical distance coordinates (EDC) as continuous features enables generalization of TFM to unseen contingencies and when they do not, demonstrating how a few labelled samples can reliably improve generalization. Through comprehensive case studies on the IEEE 68-bus system, we show that a single TFM attains an average Macro F1 score of about 90% with only 120 labelled samples per contingency, roughly two orders of magnitude fewer than conventionally assumed, without any model retraining or hyperparameter tuning. For new/unseen contingencies, we show that using just 10 labelled samples of the new contingency with EDC encoding matches the best achievable transfer learning oracle model, which requires fully labelled data and is not deployable in practice. Overall, this initial study paves the way towards developing and deploying foundation models for power system operations, with possible applications across multiple operational tasks.

Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex distributional structures imposed by network physics. We present \textsc{GenAI-FDIA}, a framework benchmarking a pool of $P{=}20$ architectures for physics-compliant FDIA synthesis, spanning Wasserstein GANs, MMD-VAEs, normalising flows, diffusion models, and cross-family hybrids. These are evaluated across three IEEE testbeds (14-bus DC, 30-bus DC, and 14-bus AC) under a 60/20/20 chronological split using data-driven Bad Data Detection (BDD) threshold calibration. Our empirical results verify that these models generate high-fidelity attacks, with all architectures achieving evasion rates of $ε_{\text{BDD}} \ge 86.6\%$ on the 14-bus network; additionally, limiting an attacker's topological knowledge induces a measurable degradation in stealthiness ($p \le 0.0022$). Crucially, we identify a previously unreported failure mode: applying affine physics projections directly in normalised feature spaces critically displaces the attack vector, collapsing BDD evasion from ${\sim}55\%$ to $<\!2\%$ on the 30-bus testbed. We resolve this via a novel inference-time harmoniser, restoring full stealthiness ($ε_{\text{BDD}}{=}100\%$) across all physics-informed variants without retraining. Finally, we isolate a covariance-collapse phenomenon ($κ\approx {-}0.076$) within advanced hybrid architectures and rectify it through 50-epoch warm-up schedules ($κ\to 0.785$, $Δ\text{MMD}={-}3.1\%$). Ultimately, \textsc{GenAI-FDIA} delivers a robust recovery blueprint applicable to any physics-constrained generative model deployed for power-system security.

This work introduces a latency-aware benchmarking framework for evaluating deep learning models in power system anomaly detection using high-fidelity, time-domain signals generated from an industry-grade electromagnetic transient simulator. Eight neural network architectures, ranging from MLPs to Transformers, were systematically evaluated on streaming datasets representing both physical faults and cyber-attacks in inverter-dominated networks. All models successfully classified two representative multi-event sequences in real time with sub-cycle response times below 15 ms. However, although classification decisions occurred within one cycle, the end-to-end inference latency consistently exceeded three cycles, ranging from 50 to 90 ms. These results highlight a critical gap between algorithmic capability and protection-grade deployment, pointing to the need for further optimization and hardware acceleration. The findings establish a reproducible benchmark for sub-cycle anomaly detection and provide guidance for transitioning machine learning methods from research prototypes to real-world protection applications.