What Does ODRL Mean? A Cross-Level Ontological Grounding of Permissions, Prohibitions, and Duties in UFO-L
Authors: Daham M. Mustafa, Christoph Lange, Giancarlo Guizzardi, Diego Collarana, Christoph Quix, Stefan Decker
Organizations: Fraunhofer FIT, Sankt Augustin, Germany · RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany · University of Twente, The Netherlands · Universidad Privada Boliviana, Bolivia
ODRL policy evaluators produce verdicts, but say nothing about the normative positions a policy brings into existence, the authority structures those positions presuppose, or who holds the power to declare a norm violated. We formulate the Cross-Level Design Principle: any normative language with violable, consequential norms requires both conduct-level positions (Permission, Duty, Right, No right) and competence-level positions (Power, Subjection, Immunity, Disability). Applying this to ODRL, we establish that prohibition is sanctioned (violation possible and consequential), that permission is underspecified across its behaviour parameter (open vs. closed world), and that the formal semantics covers achievement obligations only. We ground ODRL in UFO-L, mapping each activated rule to a simple legal relator and extending coverage from two to eight legal positions; violation-declaration authority, implicit in every existing evaluator, becomes an explicit Power-Subjection pair. All axioms are mechanically verified in Isabelle/HOL and across a 39-problem benchmark under Vampire, E, and Z3.
The ODRL policy language is emerging as the de-facto standard for policy modelling data access and usage preferences, AI governance policies and data workflows in European dataspaces. The current standard has no mathematical formal semantics to describe how a system should implement policy evaluation. This has resulted in a variety of systems and tools that implement their own interpretation of the language, which limits interoperability and cannot guarantee consistent results. Based on an existing semantic model of ODRL, we formalise the problems of ODRL evaluation for the access control and monitoring scenarios, in both static and streaming settings, and we provide a novel, efficient algorithm and implementation. We present the first ODRL Evaluator with transparent formal semantics and supporting all rule types. We experimentally measure its performance, analysing different scalability dimensions related to policy complexity and size of the data on which a policy is evaluated. We compare our system with the state-of-the-art by providing a comparative review of existing ODRL evaluators, which highlights the differences in supported ODRL features and evaluation modes.
Institutional policies stay in natural language while the systems that check compliance demand machine-readable constraints. Bridging that gap is still done by hand. PolicyKG closes the loop. It is an LLM pipeline that reads a policy PDF, classifies each sentence as an obligation, permission, or prohibition, lifts the label into first-order deontic logic, and emits SHACL constraints. Four stages run on a LangGraph state machine with per-stage validators. The piece that matters most is the Corpus Adapter: a YAML vocabulary registry that grounds LLM predicates in a target ontology. Retargeting to a new domain means swapping the registry, not retraining a model. On the Asian Institute of Technology Policies and Procedures corpus (1,663 sentences, 443 rules), PolicyKG reaches 86.9% deontic classification accuracy (Cohen's kappa = .709). Three annotators independently re-label a 50-item sample and agree at Fleiss' kappa = .844. SHACL shape correctness on a 69-shape subset is F1 = .866. The FOL path handles 79.2% of rules; the rest go through a direct NL-to-SHACL fallback. We audited every one of the 443 rules for second- or higher-order constructs. An automated regex checklist flagged none, and a first-author pass on the 92 FOL-fallback cases confirmed the same. The exact upper 95% Clopper-Pearson bound on the true HOL rate is 0.67%. This is an audit finding for one corpus, not a proof of FOL sufficiency for institutional policy. Swapping the AIT registry for a GDPR registry raises exact property alignment from 1/15 to 11/15 (Fisher's exact p < .001; Cohen's h = 1.53). On the LexDeMod lease-contract benchmark (N = 200), Macro F1 drops to .370 because lease English uses "shall be entitled" for permission -- exactly the vocabulary mismatch registry swap is meant to fix. Repeated runs produce hash-identical SHACL outputs.
We study Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE), a declarative approach to confidentiality-preserving data access, in the context of Description Logic (DL) ontologies, and for confidentiality policies expressed through Epistemic Dependencies (EDs). We first address the problem of answering queries (specifically, Boolean unions of conjunctive queries) under known semantics for CQE (GA- and IGA-entailment). Our results show that if the TBox is expressed in DL-LiteR, CQE is computationally intractable in general. Moreover, in the presence of EDs, the IGA semantics has recently been proven not to satisfy an important confidentiality preservation property known as indistinguishability. With the goal of defining computationally easier and confidentiality-preserving forms of CQE, we introduce a new semantics for CQE, based on the notion of minimal policy violation (MPV). We show that the new semantics provides a sound approximation of the previous ones, while satisfying the indistinguishability property. We also prove that, in the case of DL-LiteR ontologies, query entailment under the MPV semantics can be decided in polynomial time in data complexity. Finally, we present a software implementation of our framework that we used to evaluate the feasibility of this new approach using an existing benchmark for OWL 2 QL.