A Gravitational Interpretation of Fine-Tuning Reversion

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve strong alignment through supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback, the alignment is often fragile under subsequent fine-tuning. Existing explanations either attribute alignment fragility to gradient geometry or characterize it as a distributional shift in model outputs, yet few provide a unified account that bridges parameter-space learning dynamics with function-space alignment behavior during fine-tuning. In this work, we introduce a tractable alignment score and derive its closed-form update during fine-tuning, yielding a unified framework for alignment dynamics. Our analysis decomposes alignment updates into two competing components: a \textbf{\color{red!60!black} Rebound Force}, governed jointly by the current alignment state and the narrowness of model distribution, and a \textbf{\color{green!60!black} Driving Force}, determined by how the training distribution aligns with outcome-conditioned posteriors over aligned and non-aligned completions. This decomposition explains why prior alignment can be reversed by later fine-tuning and why narrower posterior structure strengthens such reversal. Moreover, our framework predicts a \textbf{Rehearsal Priming Effect}: prior alignment leaves a latent posterior imprint that amplifies the effective Driving Force upon re-exposure, leading to faster re-alignment. We validate these predictions across safety alignment, emergent misalignment, and sentiment settings, demonstrating consistent alignment reversal and accelerated re-alignment under re-exposure. In addition, controlled experiments in safety alignment confirm the predicted dependence of rebound strength on posterior narrowness. Together, these results provide a unified dynamical perspective on how alignment is disrupted and reactivated during LLM fine-tuning.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning large language models on malicious or incorrect outputs in narrow domains can induce broad misalignment and harmful behavior, a phenomenon known as emergent misalignment. However, efficient methods for reversing such misalignment remain limited. In this work, we make two contributions. First, we identify sycophancy fine-tuning, i.e., training models to passively agree with users' incorrect opinions, as a previously underexplored driver of emergent misalignment, and show that it induces broad and severe misaligned behavior. Second, we propose Alignment Gating, an efficient method for reversing emergent misalignment that inserts learnable and controllable gates into the model during fine-tuning. Through fine-tuning, these gates learn to identify the internal representations responsible for unsafe responses. Thus, amplifying or suppressing these representations then exacerbates or mitigates EM, respectively. We further find that alignment gating module exhibits strong generalization: gating weights obtained from narrow-domain fine-tuning substantially suppress broad-domain misaligned behavior while preserving the model's general capabilities.

A short fine-tuning run can undo the safety guards of an open-weight model---retraining a refusal-trained assistant to aid weapons development or produce hate speech. Preventing such harmful fine-tuning while retaining benign adaptability remains difficult: the only prior method with an explicit curvature certificate, spectral deformation, inflates curvature globally and thereby obstructs benign adaptation along with harmful adaptation. We propose HarmAlign, which applies function-preserving spectral deformation along a estimated contrastive activation subspace. We derive finite-sample bounds for the estimated subspace energy and the resulting local harmful-distribution curvature lower bound. A stability--progress dichotomy for constant-step gradient descent turns the certified curvature into conditional convergence-rate control. Empirically, within a fixed-architecture, finite-budget first-order threat model, HarmAlign blocks direct fine-tuning and three data- or objective-adaptive attacks across a hazardous-knowledge relearning setting and a harmful-assistance fine-tuning setting, while the protected benign tasks remain trainable. The block persists across the tested first-order optimizer variants over every attack checkpoint, and under out-of-distribution harmful fine-tuning, and it extends to important cases in our threat model: accidental safety degradation and emergent misalignment.