PolicyGuard: A Dialogue-Grounded Sub-Agent Verifier for Policy Adherence in LLM Agents

LLM agents operating under organizational policies must comply with authorization constraints typically specified in natural language. In practice, such specifications inevitably contain ambiguities and logical or semantic gaps that cause the agent's behavior to systematically diverge from the true requirements. We ask: by letting an agent evolve its policy understanding through interaction and corrective feedback from pre-deployment testing, can it autonomously refine its interpretation to close specification gaps? We propose PolicyBank, a memory mechanism that maintains structured, tool-level policy insights and iteratively refines them -- unlike existing memory mechanisms that treat the policy as immutable ground truth, reinforcing "compliant but wrong" behaviors. We also contribute a systematic testbed by extending a popular tool-calling benchmark with controlled policy gaps that isolate alignment failures from execution failures. While existing memory mechanisms achieve near-zero success on policy-gap scenarios, PolicyBank closes up to 82% of the gap toward a human oracle.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the $τ^2$-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

LLM agents are governed by long-lived natural-language prompt policies, but individually reasonable standing rules can interact in uninspected ways. We study live intra-policy rule-conflict diagnosis: finding rule pairs inside a single prompt policy that can co-govern a realistic state, and measuring how models resolve that pressure in responses or tool actions. We introduce WIRE, a Witnessed Intra-policy Rule Evaluation pipeline. WIRE extracts source-grounded rules, encodes them as PyRule clauses, uses satisfiability checks to retain same-surface hard-collision candidates, realizes those candidates as concrete co-governance witnesses, and judges model outputs against the original source-rule text. Across six public prompt policies, WIRE extracts 276 source rules and 560 atomic clauses, classifies 30,944 within-policy clause-pair comparisons, retains 170 encoded hard-collision candidate source-rule pairs, and realizes them as 1,402 concrete witnesses. In policy-only evaluation, these witnesses yield 13,335 post- generation trials where both source rules govern and both compliance labels are judgeable. Only 35.4% fall in joint compliance; 64.6% violate at least one governed source rule. These profiles are conditional diagnostics for WIRE-selected candidates, not deployment-frequency or causal excess failure estimates, but they reveal distinct policy, model, and tool-action resolution patterns.