Whose Side Is Your Agent On? Multi-Party Principal Loyalty in LLM Agents
Authors: Bojie Li, Noah Shi
Organizations: Pine AI · University of Washington
Abstract
A rapidly growing class of LLM agents is multi-party: the agent acts for a principal (who briefs it, sends follow-ups, and receives results) while also conversing in a separate channel with a counterparty whose interests may diverge (negotiating with a vendor, screening inbound requests, or mediating between employees). Here "help whoever you are talking to" is the wrong objective. The agent must stay loyal to the principal it represents without over-refusing the principal's own cooperative asks. We study this multi-party loyalty problem and contribute a measurement instrument, two mechanisms, and a structural lesson. PrincipalBench is a 75-item multi-turn benchmark with leak probes, dual judges, and an integrity-audit gate. Across 13 frontier subjects it exposes a sharp split (<=20% vs. 53.6-75.3% harm) invisible to single-turn safety evaluations: a selective cluster that declines adversarial probes while still following the principal's legitimate requests, and an over-refusing cluster that refuses broadly. (M1) A prompt-time loyalty scaffold (a fixed system prompt of seven prioritized rules, open-coded from 50+ failure trajectories) holds Claude-Sonnet to 19.4% harm and all nine selective subjects to <=20%. (M2) A per-token-KL distillation recipe transfers a prompted Qwen3-32B teacher into 8B Qwen3 and Llama-3.1 students, the strongest open-weight recipe we measure. (Lesson) Both mechanisms only move along a common leak/over-refusal trade-off rather than crossing it: improving one axis costs the other, and the jointly favorable outcome stays out of reach.
A long-lived LLM agent, such as OpenClaw, earns its value by acting on a user's preferences and constraints across sessions, not just the current request. Yet today's agents keep what a user volunteers but rarely ask for what stays unspoken, leaving a proactivity gap in long-lived LLM agents: an agent cannot act on a preference it never obtained. As users delegate more of their affairs to agents, the impact of this gap grows. We isolate one concrete, controllable slice of this gap as Ask-to-Remember (ATR): the agent decides whether to ask now for a reusable user preference that the current task does not need but a later session with the same user will. ATR is hard even to evaluate: the right question is underdetermined and its payoff deferred to tasks that may never arise. ATRBench, to the best of our knowledge the first ATR benchmark, makes it measurable by fixing each user's preferences as hidden ground truth, so success demands asking, not recall. Across eight frontier LLM agents, defaults fall at least 62 points below an oracle handed the relevant preference, and prompting closes little of it. Diagnostics identify acquisition as the bottleneck. ATRBench surfaces this proactivity gap in current agents and offers a diagnostic testbed for closing it.
We propose a personal-LLM exchange (LLM-X), a scalable negotiation-oriented environment that enables direct, structured communication across populations of personal agents (LLMs), each representing an individual user. Unlike existing tool-centric protocols that focus on agent-API interaction, LLM-X introduces a message bus and routing substrate for LLM-to-LLM coordination with guarantees around schema validity and policy enforcement. We contribute: (1) an architecture for LLM-X comprising federated gateways, topic-based routing, and policy enforcement; (2) a typed message protocol supporting capability negotiation and contract-net-style coordination; and (3) the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent negotiation at scale. Experiments span 5, 9, and 12 agents, under distinct negotiation policies (Low, Medium, High), and across both short-run (minutes) and long-run (2h, 12h) load conditions. Results highlight clear policy-performance trade-offs: stricter policies improve robustness and fairness but increase latencies and message volume. Extended runs confirm that LLM-X remains stable under sustained load, with bounded latency drift.
LLM agents will increasingly act in socially structured settings where role, audience, and relational context can shape what is advantageous or costly to say. We study whether such social structure, without any explicit objective in the prompt, changes what an agent expresses publicly relative to an off-the-record (OTR) channel elicited under the same condition. We introduce a dual-channel debate framework in which agents produce public utterances that enter the shared history alongside OTR responses that are recorded but never shown to the other participant. Across 10 models, 3 scenarios, and 5 variations within each scenario, alignment-inducing settings produce systematic public-OTR divergence in the targeted agent, with its decision divergence rising from a ∼3% baseline to roughly 40%. The effect is consistent across four aggregate analyses: stance, semantic similarity, natural language inference, and survey responses. In some cases, the OTR response explicitly attributes public accommodation to relational pressures, such as career risk or sponsorship obligation. The findings suggest that agent evaluation should extend beyond explicit goals and detect emergent objectives. We present a dual-channel evaluation framework and complementary behavioral measures that operationalize this assessment.