In two-sided marketplaces with heterogeneous products, it is important to understand the causal relationship between additional supply and marketplace outcomes, such as the total quantity transacted or transaction value in the marketplace. This paper studies a causal machine learning approach to estimating this relationship across product segments. We use the Airbnb marketplace as an example, focusing on the impact of additional listing supply on total bookings, but the methodology applies to other two-sided marketplaces. Our approach combines double/debiased machine learning with a hierarchical Bayesian framework that leverages pre-existing knowledge as priors. We construct tractable and informative features for the model by leveraging measures of product segment similarity from the geospatial literature. We find that such a model provides plausible estimates of the marketplace returns to additional supply and strong out of sample performance.
Airbnb is a community based on connection and belonging -- many hosts on Airbnb are everyday people who share their worlds to provide guests with the feeling of connection and being at home; Airbnb strives to connect people and places. Among our efforts to connect guests and hosts, we provide tools to enable hosts to set competitive prices, which helps improve affordability for guests while helping hosts get more bookings. We also personalize the guest experience to show them the listings that match their needs. To help inform these efforts, we combine economic modeling and causal inference techniques to understand how guests book stays based on the prices hosts set, among other factors, and how that preference varies across different guests and listings. Such understanding helps us identify opportunities for Airbnb to support the marketplace and better connect guests and hosts. For example, understanding how much guests respond to different prices helps optimize the tools that we provide to hosts, in order to enable hosts to choose and set competitive prices that further balance demand and supply. As another example, understanding heterogeneity in guest preferences helps us personalize the guest experience and better match them with the listings that meet their needs, based on how much they respond to different prices and other factors.
Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.
Two-sided marketplaces connect distinct user groups whose interests often conflict -- improving outcomes on one side could degrade the other side's experience. To address this challenge, we deploy an integrated framework for personalizing free-value thresholds -- a policy governing the scope of complimentary services for job listings -- across a two-sided job marketplace connecting millions of employers and job seekers. Our personalized policy delivers statistically significant and economically sizable lift in the target metric while respecting engagement guardrail constraints. Direct application of standard uplift methods proves insufficient here for two reasons. First, cross-side externalities demand multi-objective optimization: maximizing employer-side metrics risks harming job seeker engagement, with effects varying substantially across job segments. Second, marketplace interference necessitates cluster-level randomization, limiting us to few discrete treatment levels -- effectively a form of positivity violation that rules out methods designed for continuous treatments. We contribute an integrated framework with three components. Our ensemble-based hybrid ranking models target and guardrail metrics separately, cutting guardrail risk by over 10% for equivalent target gains compared to single-objective approaches. A treatment effect extrapolation method extends our estimates from limited experimental variation to untested policy levels, relying on monotonicity assumptions that we validate empirically. Finally, we present production deployment, where post-launch data confirms both extrapolation accuracy and guardrail compliance. Our deployed system demonstrates that principled methodology can enable meaningful personalization even when experiments are severely constrained and different objectives compete -- common conditions that characterize many real-world marketplaces.