Organizations: Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China · Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China · The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China · Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China · College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore · IGS, Imperial College London, London, UK · Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China
Abstract
Understanding how complex cognitive functions are organized within artificial systems is central to interpreting large language models (LLMs) and relating them to biological cognition. Yet although LLMs exhibit broad cognitive-like behaviours, it remains unclear whether their internal representations form reproducible functional systems that explain behaviour, failure and links to human cognition. Here we present NeuroCogMap, a cognitive neuroscience-inspired framework that organizes internal features of LLMs into functional parcels and links them to interpretable functions, cognitive capabilities and a cognitive hierarchy. These parcels form a stable and semantically coherent organization that is partly conserved across models and functionally linked to model outputs. Within this organization, major LLM failures, including hallucination, bias, refusal failure and sycophancy, correspond to distinct disruptions in representational and behavioural-control systems, yielding internal signatures for mechanism-guided detection and targeted intervention. Beyond model behaviour, NeuroCogMap improves prediction of human cortical responses during naturalistic language comprehension, with the strongest correspondence in higher-order association cortex. At the cognitive level, its internal signatures expose latent strategies that guide refinements of classical models of human decision-making. Together, these findings establish NeuroCogMap as a system-level framework for mapping functional organization in artificial systems and for relating this organization to human cortical function and cognitive behaviour.
LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.
Much work on the cognitive foundations of AI has focussed on comparisons between the ways in which Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans process information and represent it. One aspect of this comparison involves determining the extent to which LLMs can achieve or surpass human performance on a variety of cognitively interesting tasks. A second explores points of convergence and divergence between LLM and human systems for processing information. Here, I consider some recent research that has addressed both issues in two informational domains. The first is the representation of linguistic knowledge. The second is real world reasoning and planning. While LLMs frequently achieve impressive levels of performance and fluency on linguistic applications, they tend to handle linguistic content in ways that are distinct from human processing. They are also, for the most part, less efficient than humans in learning and generalisation for reasoning tasks.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly reported to exhibit human-like neural and cognitive signatures, including concept cells, mental number lines, and cognitive maps. These claims often rely on linear probing and activation steering applied to a single model, yet both methods are highly sensitive to measurement choices. A reported parallel may therefore reflect the model, the measurement procedure, or both. We audit four representative neuroscience-inspired paradigms across 17 models from five families, spanning 0.6B to 72B parameters. Our main experiment examines the causal steerability of concept directions. With raw activation units and a fixed layer and coefficient, steerability appears to increase with model scale, resembling an emergent capability. However, this pattern is produced by an uncalibrated pipeline rather than by a claim established in the steering literature. The trend depends jointly on raw units, the readout metric, and the operating point; correcting any one of these removes it. With residual-norm-comparable interventions and held-out operating-point selection, concept steering remains significant at every scale, but shows no significant trend across the Qwen3 series, although the confidence interval does not rule out a moderate positive slope. The remaining results are mixed. A linear geographic world map is consistently decodable in every tested checkpoint up to 72B. Number magnitude is strongly encoded, but whether individual neurons appear bell-shaped or monotonic depends on the selection criterion. Language-specific structure is localizable, but the direction of the cross-lingual asymmetry reverses under a different attribution method. These results suggest that the main constraint on AI neuroscience is not a lack of phenomena, but a lack of comparable measurements and adequate controls. We release the protocol, stimuli, and code.