Janus: a Playground for User-Involved Agentic Permission Management

As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commerical agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.

Agentic AI promises a more flexible form of digital agency: systems that can act on users' behalf, from filtering content to negotiating prices to selecting services. Whether it will empower users is an open question, and we argue that the answer depends on more than the technology. We conduct a comparative case analysis of four more mature domains where similar forms of agency arose: browser-based ad blockers, platform recommender systems, financial robo-advisors, and email spam governance. Across the cases, decisions about whose interests agents would serve were resolved through technical arrangements: API choices, protocol governance, industry standards, and default configurations. Beyond their technical form, these were political decisions. We identify this as depoliticization, a concept from political theory, here at work in technological systems. Its most consequential effect is that individual outcomes and collective contestation capacity can move in opposite directions: spam inbox quality improved substantially while the organized capacity to contest spam governance collapsed. Where intermediary institutions sustained adversarial challenge, user-aligned agency proved more durable; where proprietary infrastructure and closed standard-setting absorbed contestation, displacement compounded. We apply this to agentic AI, where governance arrangements consolidating around the Model Context Protocol and the Agentic AI Foundation are settling these configurations before the choices that define what agents can do move outside the reach of users and the public.

Coding agents now run autonomously with shell, file, and network privileges. When a user issues a benign request, the agent sometimes does more than asked: it deletes unrelated files, wipes a stale credentials backup, or rewrites configuration the user never mentioned. We call these scope expansions overeager actions, an authorization problem distinct from capability failures, prompt injection, or sandbox escapes. We present OverEager-Gen, a benchmark dedicated to overeager behavior on benign tasks. Building it surfaces a measurement-validity issue: if a benchmark spells out the authorized scope inside the prompt, the agent stops inferring boundaries and starts pattern-matching declaration text. On Claude Code, stripping the consent declaration alone raises the overeager rate from 0.0% to 17.1% on paired scenarios (McNemar exact p = 2.4 x 10^-4). OverEager-Gen therefore certifies each scenario's discriminative power before admission via a behavioral-gradient validator, audits internal tool calls through a dual-channel stack (PATH-injected shim plus per-agent event streams), and ships byte-identical consent_kept and consent_stripped variants. OverEager-Bench contains 500 validated scenarios and ~7,500 runs across four agent products (Claude Code, OpenHands, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) and six base models; a 50-sample re-annotation gives Cohen's kappa = 0.73 and rule-judge recall = 1.00. Stripping consent multiplies the overeager rate on every shared base model (Delta in [11.9, 17.2] pp). The framework axis dominates effect size: a permissive cluster (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) runs at 5.4-27.7% while the ask-to-continue framework (OpenHands) sits at 0.2-4.5% (Fisher p <= 10^-5). Within-framework base-model variance reaches 15.9 pp, indicating that model-layer alignment does not fully propagate through permissive permission gating.