cs.CRJul 2, 2026

Has This Checkpoint Been Abliterated? A Two-Signal Audit and Its Failure Map

Authors: Gabriel Hurtado

Organizations: Moonsong Labs

Abstract

Can a platform tell, before deployment, whether an open-weight checkpoint has had its refusal mechanism stripped? Runtime guards cannot: they score generations, not the artifact. We combine two cheap internal signals, a reference-anchored activation refusal-gap and a weight-recovery energy of the base-to-candidate weight difference, into a threshold-free checkpoint audit. The two are negatively correlated and label-complementary: the gap supplies refusal-specificity and the weight energy supplies recall. On a 273-checkpoint registry spanning Qwen, DeepSeek-distilled Qwen, Llama, and Gemma, their z-sum separates 57 public abliterations from 37 benign fine-tunes, merges, and instruction-tunes at AUROC 0.95, significantly above either signal alone (0.84, 0.90), and a Youden-calibrated threshold transfers to held-out families at balanced accuracy 0.89 (FPR 0.11), missing only 4 of 57. We then map two failures, in order of severity: a spoofed reference evades both axes with no training (ΔW=0, \r{ho}=1 by construction), and a white-box owner trains a checkpoint past the threshold while it stays guard-unsafe and coherent. The audit is effective triage, not tamper-proofing: it presumes an attested reference, and its claims are bounded by the registry we evaluate it on.

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