A Preliminary Study on Explaining Risk of Code Changes using LLM-Based Prediction Models

At Amazon Prime Video, we face the critical operational challenge of managing code deployments during live events and rapid feature releases without causing service outages. Current change control approaches use blanket deployment freezes that block all changes regardless of risk, creating significant developer toil. While prior research has explored risky change predictors, these rely on developer-specific metadata or extensive historical data, raising privacy concerns and limiting applicability to new projects. We introduce a framework centered on diff-aware features, characteristics derived directly from code modifications. Our key contribution is the systematic identification of which quantitative metrics (code-level and change-level metrics) and qualitative indicators (coding style violations, change type classification) are necessary for risk prediction. We employ LLMs as multi-language feature extractors, demonstrating their effectiveness for code analysis beyond generation tasks and eliminating the need for language-specific tooling. We evaluated our framework on two datasets: Prime Video's production environment and the public ApacheJIT dataset. Our best-performing model achieves an average recall of 0.83 and F1 score of 0.81 across both datasets for detecting risky code changes. Notably, ablation analysis reveals that change-level volume metrics (e.g., lines added/deleted) are noisy predictors, while structural code complexity provides a substantially stronger risk signal. These results demonstrate that thoughtful feature curation enables effective change risk assessment across different programming languages and organizational contexts while avoiding privacy concerns.

LLM code reviewers often estimate patch risk and make approval decisions in one prompt. A probability should depend on evidence; costs should determine the action taken from it. We test whether four deployed reviewer interfaces preserve this separation using 15,792 responses on 720 candidate patches, with one that passed and one that failed an archived test harness for each of 360 repository issues. In matched calls with the patch and monitor evidence fixed, replacing an equal-cost policy with a 10:1 false-accept policy changes reported failure probabilities by 13.6 to 16.9 percentage points on average. For every reviewer, the actions returned under the high-cost prompt are worse than rejecting all patches. Applying the same high-cost rule to probabilities elicited under equal costs reduces loss for all four systems, showing that probability elicitation itself contributes to the excess loss. We also evaluate a modular pipeline that elicits risk without policy information, combines an independent monitor score, and applies costs in code. Relative to calibrated reviewer-only scores, the pipeline improves average probability accuracy and, at equal costs, reduces mean loss by .073 per issue while accepting 58 to 68% of patches. At 10:1, it accepts none and matches reject-all. Downstream policy can therefore change the probability it is meant to use, motivating separate evaluation of risk, outside evidence, and action.

Researchers and practitioners increasingly apply Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated vulnerability detection. Recent work has shown that LLMs are susceptible to the same cognitive heuristics that bias human judgment. Yet, no work has investigated whether these heuristics affect a model's assessment of code vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present the first systematic exploration of cognitive heuristics in LLM-driven code vulnerability detection. We introduce a controlled framework that holds the code fixed and only varies the surrounding context to trigger three cognitive heuristics: the halo effect through author attribution, the framing effect through task objectives and consequences, and the anchoring effect through prior analysis results. Within this framework, we evaluate eight LLMs across three programming languages and perform both quantitative and code-level analyses. Our findings demonstrate that all evaluated models are susceptible to these heuristics. Cross-model average susceptibility is highest for framing at 33.2%, followed by anchoring at 23.5% and halo at 18.4%. Code-level analysis reveals that vulnerabilities that require semantic reasoning for detection are more susceptible to cognitive heuristics than those identifiable through pattern matching. Furthermore, models often change their verdict from safe to vulnerable based on the cognitive condition, without accurately identifying the actual vulnerability. To highlight the practical impact, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept black-box cognitive attack that can suppress up to 97% of previously detected vulnerabilities. These findings indicate that cognitive susceptibility is a consistent and exploitable property of LLM-based vulnerability detection.