Diagnosing Correctness Probes under Self-Judgement Confounding

Test-time reasoning has become a significant field of study since the introduction of chain-of-thought reasoning in large language models (LLMs). However, the mechanisms of this reasoning process are still under-explored -- from the same input prompt, and even the same partial solution, LLMs can produce varied answers if sampled multiple times. We propose to leverage question-asking as an inference-time intervention that articulates information about the model's hidden state. To achieve that, we present a student-teacher setting where a student asks questions to a teacher. We train a probe on the student's hidden state before and after asking a question and find it is predictive of the trajectory's final correctness, even before generating the teacher's answer. This suggests there is a meaningful signal from the self-diagnosis that occurs during question generation rather than information transfer from the teacher. We then frame question-asking as a sequential decision problem, using this probe as a quality score, and define a gating policy to ask questions that maximize likelihood of correctness. We find that the success of question-asking as an intervention is largely dependent on the model's self-consistency. Our empirical results show a gap between detection and recovery; while our gating policy captures model correctness and uncertainty, interventions are equally likely to harm correct trajectories as they are to recover incorrect ones. This gap between diagnosis and correction has broader implications on language models' capacity for self-refinement under uncertainty.

Code generated by modern language models often reads naturally. Yet, it also often fails to implement what was asked. This should be no surprise, as research shows the models' own confidence signals are poorly calibrated with actual correctness. A promising way to assess correctness looks inside the model: by contrasting the hidden states of correct and incorrect programs, recent work captured an internal signal of code correctness that is able to judge candidate solutions better than the model's token-level or stated confidence, with no test execution. However, this signal was captured under one particular way, leaving open an important question: whether it reflects a robust property of the model or an artifact of that choice. We study this question systematically, varying how the signal is extracted from the model internals. Besides this, we also ask if the signal's quality is limited by the data used to extract it, by constructing program pairs that differ only in the fault that makes them incorrect. Our results show that no single configuration is best, and that isolating the fault does not help.

Training a language model against its own reference-free judgments (the premise of self-rewarding, self-play, and LLM-as-a-judge pipelines) assumes a model's verdict on a shown answer tracks correctness. We show it fails structurally: conditioned on a candidate, a judge scores plausibility, not correctness, leaving false-positive basins a policy learns to exploit. We measure this with a hidden-anchor audit: a held-out, cross-source exact-match check the judge never sees. On GSM8K with Qwen3 policies, self-play drives the judge's pass rate from 0.72 to 0.94 while true accuracy stays at 0.20 (three seeds). This reward hacking is not white-box gaming: the errors transfer across judge families (Qwen, Llama, Gemma) and scales, a strict three-judge ensemble still accepts 55% of them, and no plausibility-scoring defense closes the basin. The decisive variable is whether the judge commits an answer of its own before using the candidate: committing first drops the false-positive rate from 0.719 to 0.012, blind solving lifts discrimination to 0.96, and used as the training reward the de-anchored channel keeps false positives at zero, preventing the basin rather than only detecting it. A falsifiable bound (the gap is at most 1 - accuracy) predicts which regimes are exposed. The full arc replicates without training under best-of-N selection in code and competition math, and with a Gemma policy.