Abstract
Phishing emails remain one of the most persistent cybersecurity threats, and machine-learning classifiers are widely used to detect them. Most reported detection accuracies, however, are measured on clean, in-distribution test data rather than on emails deliberately altered to evade detection. This paper reports a controlled, pairwise comparison of two phishing-detection approaches a TF-IDF + Logistic Regression baseline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT transformer trained on a unified corpus of 82,255 emails drawn from six public datasets and evaluated under three conditions: normal in-distribution, synthetic phishing, and adversarial phishing. Both models exceeded 98% accuracy on clean data yet degraded sharply under adversarial testing: TF-IDF + LR fell to 64.00% (a 34.59-percentage-point drop) and DistilBERT fell to 63.64% (a 35.40-percentage-point drop) a gap of only 0.36 percentage points, equivalent to a single email in the 275-sample adversarial test set. LIME, SHAP, and attention-rollout analysis indicate the two models relied on different evidence yet showed similar vulnerability. Pairwise error analysis shows the models agreed on 54.9% of adversarial samples but each made a similar number of exclusive errors (24 and 25 respectively), indicating partly complementary rather than identical failure modes. The results show that clean-data accuracy does not predict adversarial robustness, and that adversarial testing should be a standard part of phishing-detection evaluation.
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