Organizations: Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, 4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8904, Japan · aResearch Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, 4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8904, Japan · bDepartment of Aeronautics and Astronautics, School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8656, Japan
Abstract
Shippers are beginning to delegate carrier selection to large language model (LLM) agents. We ask what such delegation does to a freight matching market, and which platform design choices contain it. We carried out agent-based simulations in which fifty shipper agents, built on commercial LLMs from OpenAI (GPT), Anthropic (Claude), and Google (Gemini), procure truckload capacity for thirty days. The market implements the rules of digital freight matching: each load is offered down the shipper's ranked list of carriers (waterfall tendering), carriers have daily capacity limits, spot prices respond to congestion, and carrier ratings accumulate with transactions. We found three risks and one remedy that works. Agents converged at once: for a fixed sampled carrier population, the same carrier was the modal first choice of every model on day one, attracting up to 76% of requests. Because each agent picks from its own randomly drawn list of displayed candidates, the platform controls how many options each shipper sees; concentration rose steeply once lists exceeded about ten carriers, with the onset differing across models. Which carriers ended up dominant varied widely from one sampled market to another, and displaying true quality instead of estimated ratings changed neither the level nor this variability (by design, quality affects only what agents see, never delivery outcomes). Against these risks, disclosing each carrier's remaining daily capacity cut concentration by a third and doubled shipper surplus, while vendor diversification, list-order randomization, and popularity display showed no clearly detectable effect. Platform information design, ahead of model choice or model regulation, is the lever that works.
Large language models (LLMs) now serve as conversational shopping assistants on platforms that also sell advertising. These AI agents face a conflict of duty. They advise consumers who rely on their judgment, yet are deployed by platforms that benefit when sponsored listings are chosen. Sponsorship disclosures, designed to allow consumers to penalize paid placements, now reach the AI agent rather than the consumer, and the agent's evaluation of them is hidden from the consumer. Drawing on the fiduciary concept of conflict of duty, we argue that an agent's evaluation of a sponsored listing should not depend on which party deployed it. In controlled choice experiments, we manipulate assigned roles in the system prompt to name either a traveler or a booking platform as the agent's principal. Platform delegation significantly attenuates the penalty that agents apply to sponsored listings and weakens the skepticism that disclosure triggers in their reasoning traces. We replicate out findings across LLMs and reasoning depths. A second study decomposes the disclosure label and shows that the divergence between the two delegates widens significantly when the paid placement is attributed to the platform. Stricter terminology ("Sponsored" instead of "Promoted") lowers choice of paid listings but does not close this gap when the platform is named. The findings show that disclosure mandates designed for human consumers cannot by themselves protect consumers in AI-mediated commerce.
Freight brokerages negotiate thousands of carrier rates daily under dynamic pricing conditions where models frequently revise targets mid-conversation. Classical time-dependent concession frameworks use a fixed shape parameter β that cannot adapt to these updates. Deriving β from the live spread enables adaptation but introduces a new problem: a pricing shift can cause the formula to retract a previous offer, violating monotonicity. LLM-powered brokers offer flexibility but require expensive reasoning models, produce non-deterministic pricing, and remain vulnerable to prompt injection. We propose a two-index anchor-and-resume framework that addresses both limitations. A spread-derived β maps each load's margin structure to the correct concession posture, while the anchor-and-resume mechanism guarantees monotonically non-decreasing offers under arbitrary pricing shifts. All pricing decisions remain in a deterministic formula; the LLM, when used, serves only as a natural-language translation layer. Empirical evaluation across 115,125 negotiations shows that the adaptive β tailors behavior by regime: in narrow spreads, it concedes quickly to prioritize deal closure and load coverage; in medium and wide spreads, it matches or exceeds the best fixed-β baselines in broker savings. Against an unconstrained 20-billion-parameter LLM broker, it achieves similar agreement rates and savings. Against LLM-powered carriers as more realistic stochastic counterparties, it maintains comparable savings and higher agreement rates than against rule-based opponents. By decoupling the LLM from pricing logic, the framework scales horizontally to thousands of concurrent negotiations with negligible inference cost and transparent decision-making.
We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.