A Framework for Reputation Aware Uninorm-driven Consensus Algorithms for Blockchain Networks

Traditional distributed consensus protocols classify nodes as either honest-but-faulty or actively malicious (Byzantine). However, in organizational structures, departmental agents rarely fit this binary. Instead, they exhibit bounded rationality and self-interested preferences while operating under asymmetric information. This paper presents the Organizational Consensus Algorithm (OCA), a mechanism design framework tailored for internal negotiation and decision coordination. OCA models inter-departmental conflict as an incomplete information dynamic game, integrating internal token staking, an exception-triggered challenge mechanism, and confidence-weighted consensus rules. Rather than enforcing instantaneous total ordering, OCA leverages a retrospective penalty system driven by delayed verifiable outcomes to deter structural bias and reduce exhaustive coordination overhead. A Python simulation prototype was developed to evaluate OCA. Across independent trials with varying organizational scales, OCA reports lower coordination overhead, higher informative reporting rates, and bounded welfare loss in noisy environments. Crucially, these results remain conditional on the stated simulation model and do not by themselves establish a general truthful equilibrium.

We consider a problem arising in proof-of-stake blockchain environments, where agents called nominators select validators - entities responsible for maintaining the blockchain's physical infrastructure. The selection process is inherently subjective and multi-criterial and combines with the fact that nominators commonly operate through multiple accounts. This gives rise to a portfolio selection problem, where agents seek to distribute their nominations across accounts to diversify risk. We propose a decision support framework to optimize this selection by simultaneously maximizing two objectives: the expected utility of the validators likely to be allocated, representing portfolio quality and profitability, and the expected entropy of the allocation, representing diversification and risk mitigation across stashes. Validator utilities are derived using an original active preference learning procedure based on multi-attribute value theory, with emphasis on top-ranked validators. The resulting bi-objective optimization problem is solved with a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm and, to support the final choice, we introduce an interactive binary search navigation procedure that guides the nominator through the front and identifies a satisfactory trade-off with only a few questions. Numerical experiments examine the optimization strategies, while an expert assessment involving five experienced nominators confirms the approach's practical relevance and usefulness.

Private blockchain networks run with fixed node configurations that cannot adapt to changing workload conditions. Too many nodes serving a light workload waste resources; too few nodes facing heavy demand slow block production and degrade finalisation. The right validator count is hard to determine, as it depends on overlapping factors that shift over time. This paper presents a Takagi-Sugeno (TS) fuzzy inference system that reads live blockchain parameters (block production time, block size, and active node count) and outputs a continuous efficiency score alongside a scaling recommendation: Scale Up, Maintain, or Scale Down. The controller uses triangular membership functions across three linguistic variables, evaluated through a complete 27-rule base with product t-norm aggregation. A key contribution is an empirical recalibration of the membership functions, anchoring linguistic terms to the observed operating range of the testbed rather than to theoretical extremes. The system is evaluated on a 10-node Substrate blockchain network storing real smart water meter data hashes from the Queensland Government open data portal. Statistical analysis across configurations of 4, 7, and 10 active nodes confirms that the controller produces distinct operational profiles reflecting each configuration's provisioning state. In closed-loop experiments, the controller autonomously adjusts validator participation in both directions, activating validators under rising load and removing them under over-provisioning, converging to the same stable equilibrium from both directions. Compared against three threshold-based baselines, it shows fewer scaling oscillations while maintaining comparable block production times. Results show that TS fuzzy inference can support autonomous validator management in private blockchain deployments, with stable scaling behaviour threshold approaches cannot match.