Beyond Byzantine: An Organizational Consensus Algorithm for Self-Interested Agents Under Information Asymmetry

Coordination research collapses four objects: operative control, authorization, a model-derived friction score, and observed outcomes. The Axiom of Consent is a stake-weighted unanimity principle; majority and supermajority thresholds are explicit relaxations, not versions of the axiom. Decision loci are structural facts, whereas authorization and legitimacy require normative and measurement premises. Alignment, calibrated stakes, and information deficit are candidate coordinates, and F = sigma(1 + epsilon)/(1 + alpha) is a phenomenological ansatz. The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism supplies a conditional persistence interface: irreducibility suffices for its finite, static, positive-fitness continuous-time Perron result; primitivity is required only for the corresponding discrete-time power convergence, and the componentwise ranking is narrower. Neither persistence result derives authorization. A resource-allocation instantiation specifies an identification contract but observes no authorization acts or effective voice. Its exploratory MARL companion uses target-vector correlation and observation noise as narrow proxy treatments, not measures of general alignment or information deficit. Under that proxy and reward-gap design, the composite loses to an independent-effects model and a feasible-centred frozen crossing yields the opposite interaction direction. Cooperative target correlation lowers the gap under shared-state contention; separable IQL is structurally invariant and separable VDN is a non-detection. Paired partial sharing modulates the gradient without establishing an exact dose law or endpoint equivalence. Target support changes opposition and residual-policy conclusions. The surviving contribution is an authorization architecture and measurement discipline, not a universal friction law.

Distributed blackbox consensus optimization is a fundamental problem in multi-agent systems, where agents must improve a global objective using only local objective queries and limited neighbor communication. Existing methods largely rely on handcrafted update rules and static cooperation patterns, which often struggle to balance local adaptation, global coordination, and communication efficiency in heterogeneous nonconvex environments. In this paper, we take an initial step toward trajectory-driven self-design for distributed black-box consensus optimization. We first redesign the agent-level swarm dynamics with an adaptive internal mechanism tailored to decentralized consensus settings, improving the balance between exploration, convergence, and local escape. Built on top of this adaptive execution layer, we propose Learning to Act and Cooperate (LACMAS), a trajectorydriven framework in which large language models provide sparse highlevel guidance for shaping both agentinternal action behaviors and agentexternal cooperation patterns from historical optimization trajectories. We further introduce a phased cognitive scheduling strategy to activate different forms of adaptation in a resource-aware manner. Experiments on standard distributed black-box benchmarks and real-world distributed tasks show that LAC-MAS consistently improves solution quality, convergence efficiency, and communication efficiency over strong baselines, suggesting a practical route from handcrafted distributed coordination toward self-designing multi-agent optimization systems.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.