In many social-science research tasks, such as economics, LLM-based agents must produce outputs for which no cheap, task-complete, machine-readable correctness signal exists. This creates a distinctive reliability problem for multi-agent systems: how should generation, critique, coordination, and human judgment be organized when no component can certify the final result? We address this problem through pAI-Econ-claude, a gated, human-in-the-loop multi-agent architecture for AI-assisted economic theory development. Agents coordinate through a shared workspace of inspectable intermediate records; specialized gates diagnose targeted failure modes and recommend loopbacks without certifying correctness; and human checkpoints retain authority over decisions that are costly to reverse. We evaluate the architecture on five matched economic-theory tasks against an ungated baseline. Two evaluators blinded to configuration agreed on all five pairwise rankings, preferring the gated architecture in four tasks and the baseline in one. Mean failure severity fell from 1.58 to 1.16, while overall usefulness rose from 2.60 to 3.10. The largest observed gain occurred when a reality check rejected a false market-structure premise and a proof review prompted revision of a false welfare claim. The negative case shows that scaffolding can also compress an economically important mechanism too aggressively. The results support a bounded claim: gated oversight improves the auditability of AI-assisted economic theory without substituting for formal verification, and the allocation of irreversible human judgment is a more informative design variable than pure agent autonomy. The workflow is publicly available at https://github.com/maxwell2732/pAI-Econ-claude.
Can artificial intelligence (AI) refute economic theory? I document experiments in which I asked several AI models (Gemini, Refine, Claude, and ChatGPT) to check the correctness of four published papers in economic theory, each containing an error that I helped identify or correct. ChatGPT Pro performed best, occasionally constructing counterexamples and corrected proofs, while other models fared worse. However, no model located a true error without substantial human guidance, and data contamination complicates interpretation. I argue that a competent human paired with a frontier model can outperform current peer review, but AI cannot yet refute economic theory on its own.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks once reserved for trained researchers, including hypothesis generation, specification choice, and drafting conclusions. We argue that the reliability of AI-assisted research depends not only on model capability, but also on how cognitive labour is structured between humans and machines. We study this problem through Human-in-the-Loop Economic Research (HLER), a decision architecture based on pre-commitment, decision sequencing, accountability, and attention allocation. In a pre-specified 2*4 factorial experiment with 280 complete research runs across four datasets, an unconstrained multi-agent baseline produced critical failures in 72% of runs. Using the same underlying model, the same agent decomposition, and identical prompts for the shared reasoning agents, HLER reduced the failure rate to 16% by imposing three architectural commitments: LLMs reason but do not execute data work, data and estimation are handled deterministically, and three human decision gates bind the workflow. Fisher's exact test rejects equality of failure rates at p<0.001. Reliability gains were largest on the least publicly represented dataset, a Qing-dynasty population register, consistent with a task-based production model with Frechet-distributed output quality. An 80-run ablation suggests that deterministic computation and human gates contribute independently, with exploratory evidence of complementarity. We interpret HLER as a research harness rather than an autonomous AI scientist: it sharply reduces failures, makes residual weaknesses more visible, and prevents unreliable claims from being advanced as publication-ready outputs.
Multi-agent studies commonly place AI agents in predefined games, markets, or roles, making it difficult to distinguish endogenous economic organization from behavior inherited from the scenario. We ask whether economic relations emerge when agents receive executable mechanisms for work, transfer, elections, and allocation but no prescribed social or economic strategy. We define AI Agent Economics as systems of production, allocation, consumption, exchange, and institutions that alter agents' future feasible actions. We develop a two-stage framework comprising a no-production boundary test and 24 independent six-agent worlds across GPT and DeepSeek. Without productive tasks, agents communicate and govern resource provision but show no substantive inter-agent transfer activity. With verified work and scarce task access, transfers, loans, access promises, vote-for-access exchanges, and allocation strategies emerge. Holding the election interface fixed, executable allocation authority increases differentiation while reducing failed allocation and prolonged exclusion. When energy becomes symbolic, continuation support disappears, yet competition over task access persists. These findings show that organization follows executable rights and resource consequences rather than role labels or prompt language, and motivate governance audits of the mechanisms that actually constrain agents' future actions.