Artificial Epanorthosis: Why large language models overuse a classical rhetorical figure, and how to mitigate it

Prompt echoing is a recognized failure mode of instruct language models, in which a model instead of generating a response, mirrors the provided prompt, even though it did not receive a specific instruction to do so. Is this phenomenon a sign of the model leaking the content of its training dataset, or is it rather caused by a misaligned behavior of the internal induction/copying mechanisms? We investigate prompt echoing small language models from different families (Gemma, Llama, Qwen, SmolLM and OLMo) and show that echoing prompts are likely to have partial overlap with the training dataset but the phenomenon is primarily driven by the model's induction heads.

Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade. We report two controlled experiments crossing all three factors on one held, contamination-free synthetic corpus (the "Book of Veyra," 8,780 uniquely-named entities, deterministically regenerable from a fixed seed), evaluated across five models. Experiment 1 (960 calls/model) measures instruction-following decay as rule count N grows from 10 to 160, crossed with four formats and system-prompt vs. user-turn placement. Perfect-response rate collapses to zero by N=80 for every model, format, and placement. Placement produces effects at least as large as format at N=160 in most models, but the direction is model-specific. No model shows a reliable markdown advantage; one 35B model favors plain text instead. Experiment 2 (5,520 calls/model) measures recall accuracy, false-premise sycophancy, and absent-fact fabrication across a 2k-to-512k-token context ladder in the same four formats. Recall stays near ceiling through 64-128k tokens, then degrades sharply and format-dependently: one model's accuracy spread reaches 48 points at 128k tokens. Fabrication never occurs (0/5,760 probes), and sycophancy stays negligible (<=8.3%). What rises sharply near each model's context ceiling is outright refusal to answer (0% to 79-90%), distinct from sycophancy or fabrication. Neither pre-registered format ordering holds, and token overhead (+22% to +37% over plain text) further changes which format is preferable where accuracy spread is genuine. We release the full harness, corpus generator, and raw results (VeyraBench): https://github.com/iNetanel/veyrabench

Factual sycophancy occurs when a language model abandons a correct, verifiable answer under social pressure. Because a flip occurs only when pressure toward a false answer exceeds the model's neutral preference for the truth, flip rates conflate two mechanisms: the strength of that baseline preference (truth margin), and how far pressure shifts it (manipulation sensitivity). We decompose factual sycophancy into these channels and use them to separate the effects of size and instruction tuning across 56 open-weight models spanning 0.3B-32B parameters and 13 manipulation types. We find that vulnerability is governed mainly by size, but instruction tuning changes how size acts: small instruction-tuned models can become less robust, whereas large instruction-tuned models usually become more robust. Instruction tuning primarily increases truth margin, but its behavioral effect depends on manipulation type. Scaling also changes the two channels differently: base models gain margin but become mildly more manipulation-sensitive, whereas instruction-tuned models gain margin faster and become less sensitive. Factual sycophancy is therefore not a single scalar property. Evaluations should report channel-specific, manipulation-specific, and size-conditioned robustness rather than flip rates alone.