Beyond Sycophancy: Structured Resistance and Compliance in LLM Moral Reasoning

We propose a novel perspective for probing LLM sycophancy in a direct and neutral way, mitigating various forms of uncontrolled bias, noise, or manipulative language, deliberately injected to prompts in prior works. A key novelty of our approach is the use of an LLM-as-a-judge in a zero-sum betting game. Within this framework, sycophancy serves one individual (the user) while explicitly incurring cost on another. Comparing 11 leading models we find that while most models exhibit significant sycophantic tendencies in the common setting, in which sycophancy is self-serving to the user and incurs no cost on others, seven of the models exhibit ``moral remorse'', five of which significantly over-compensate for their sycophancy in case it explicitly harms a third party. We refer to this phenomenon as `anti-sycophancy' bias and discuss possible causes for this shift.

As language models take integrated roles across many domains, the response of LLMs to user pushback becomes a critical alignment property. Yet many existing evaluations treat compliance as unidirectional, measuring whether models resist pressure but not whether they resist it selectively. We introduce Compliance Asymmetry (A = BCR/HCR), a bidirectional diagnostic that compares beneficial output change under helpful nudges with harmful change under misleading nudges. Across 9 models and 972,000 nudge-condition responses, we find that this selectivity differs in factual and moral judgments: models follow helpful nudges more than harmful ones on factual questions (A = 1.58), but follow both directions at nearly identical rates on moral questions (A = 1.04). This phenomenon persists across model families, capability levels, and nudging types. Interestingly, we also find that chain-of-thought prompting amplifies helpful and harmful compliance together, while identity-based prompting suppresses both by nearly identical margins. These results identify direction-blind moral compliance as a distinct failure mode in current LLMs and suggest that alignment should target directionally calibrated updating rather than lower compliance alone.

This position paper argues that sycophancy in LLMs is a boundary failure between social alignment and epistemic integrity. Existing work often operationalizes sycophancy through external behavior such as agreement with incorrect user beliefs, position reversals, or deviation from an objective standard of correctness. These formulations capture only overt forms of the phenomenon and leave subtler boundary failures involving epistemic integrity and social alignment underspecified. We argue that sycophancy should not be understood as agreement alone, but as alignment behavior that displaces independent epistemic judgment. To clarify this boundary, we propose a three-condition framework for sycophancy. First, the user expresses a cue in the form of a belief, preference, or self-concept. Second, the model shifts toward that cue through alignment behavior. Third, this shift compromises epistemic accuracy, independent reasoning, or appropriate correction. We also introduce a taxonomy for classifying sycophancy, consisting of alignment targets, mechanisms, and severity. The paper concludes by discussing implications for alignment evaluation and argues for boundary-aware assessment, structured rubrics, and mitigation strategies, while situating these proposals alongside alternative views of sycophancy.